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by 
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Research Advisors:  
 Prof. Dr. Chunming Rong, Dr. Matthias Winkler 
 
The international supply chain brings a wide range of threats: including the smuggling 
of illegal goods and substances, and the tampering with sea containers in order to hide 
nuclear, chemical or other weapons in them. Moreover with the introduction of House 
Resolution 1 (or “100% scanning law”) marine ports may face a problem of increased 
workload and unacceptable bottle-necks in their work flow as a result of scanning of 
every container. 
To improve the security of supply chains, there is a need to assess potential risks. The 
purpose of this study was to develop a concept for risk evaluation of sea containers 
bound for the USA and EU. The risk assessment should be efficient, cost effective and 
not cause big delays in work of marine ports.   
The investigation was conducted on how logistical data which is provided to customs 
authorities by all supply chain participants as well as different container inspection 
technologies (e.g. x-ray) can help to enhance the security of an international supply 
chain. The main research questions which were addressed in the project are: 
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 which exact information is needed for container risk evaluation; 
 how this information can be evaluated; 
 how to integrate the risk evaluation process into the supply chain. 
As a result of the Master’s project a semi-automatic evaluation approach as an 
alternative to the “100% scanning law” was suggested. A prototype supporting the 
evaluation of security relevant container and supply chain data was developed for the 
evaluation of the concept. The developed concept together with the prototype reduces 
the need for a container scan and introduces a possible green lane scenario, enhances 
security through additional security related information and supports customs/border 
personnel during the evaluation of container security risks.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
In today’s World there is a great need to be socially and environmentally responsible, as 
well as anticipate and, where possible, mitigate security risks in advance. One of the 
challenges for governments and logistical companies is to solve the problem of balance 
between increasing the security in international trade, especially in containerized traffic, 
and reducing administrative burden and time delay in international supply chain. A 
supply chain is a framework of organizations, activities, information and technologies 
involved in the transportation of a product from manufacturer to customer. An 
international supply chain involves multiple enterprises and organizations (including 
customs authorities) which work together to deliver a product from one country to 
another. The international supply chain brings a wide range of threats: including the 
smuggling of illegal goods and substances, and the tampering with sea containers in 
order to hide nuclear, chemical or other weapons in them. From a risk assessment point 
of view the most hazardous threat is transportation of nuclear weapon, as the 
consequences from an explosion will have a devastating impact. Securing an 
international supply chain is very complicated process and includes many entities: 
infrastructure, facilities, carriers, people, cargo and information exchange. Several 
legislations were initiated with the goal of securing supply chains. Examples are the US 
National Strategy For Global Supply Chain Security (1) and the “100% scanning” law 
(2). 
My Mater Thesis work is a part of the ECSIT (Increase of container security by 
applying contactless inspections in port terminals, German - Erhöhung der 
Containersicherheit durch berührungslose Inspektion im Hafenterminal) project.  The 
project goal is the development of infrastructure that allows the capture of relevant 
information needed for the security evaluation of containers and the improvement of 
supply chain management visibility and security. This infrastructure should support 
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container scanning and information exchange between participants of the secure supply 
chain and provide integration with the Port Community System, scanning infrastructure, 
customs authorities and customers. The project analyses security risk and requirements 
of end-users, legislation (European Union and American), possible inspection 
technologies and how they can be embedded into the terminal’s environment. The long 
term goal of the project is to increase container security through development of 
innovative technologies, such as container scanning, and analysis of their integration 
potential with existing harbor operations and processes. 
Everyday Customs Authorities process a huge amount of data in order to analyze 
whether cargo possess a certain risk or not. Only in 2001, U.S. Customs processed more 
than 214,000 vessels and 5.7 million sea containers (3). The data provided to U.S. 
authorities can contain information about compliance history of the company-importer, 
its financial solvency, security measures taken to eliminate the possibility of smuggling, 
unauthorized access to cargo units and tampering with cargo. As a result of the “100% 
scanning” law, U.S. authorities will have to evaluate also x-ray images and scan for radio 
activity. The information comes to U.S. authorities from different companies, systems 
and in different forms. Based on this information U. S. authorities need to make the 
right decision about potential security risks posed by of containers quickly and at low 
cost. 
The problem which I highlight in my Master Thesis is the fact that it is not clear 
which exact information needed by the customs authorities for their security 
evaluations, nor is it clear how the customs authorities will evaluate the risk of 
containers based on this information. As an example, it is unclear how container scan 
images evaluation can be integrated into border processing; the issue became important 
especially after the endorsement of the “100% scanning” law. 
The goal of this Master’s Thesis is the development of a concept for a security risk 
evaluation process needed when deciding if a container may cross the border or not. 
The development of the concept includes assumptions on security data needed by the 
customs authority and the understanding of which parts of the process can be 
automated and which part must be conducted manually. 
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Also as part of this Master Thesis, a prototype for the partial implementation of the 
concept was developed. The prototype helped evaluate the concept. 
In my Master’s Thesis research I use an approach which includes: 
 Research on the current situation in secure supply chain management for 
understanding the project context, including: existing technical solutions for 
supply chain management; current legal regulations for importing cargo into the 
United States and Europe; current and finished projects for cargo security (i.e. 
projects which concern only the technical part of container security such as e-
seals or CSDs infrastructure as well as integration projects aimed to improve 
supply chain visibility and security).  
 Development of a concept for data integration and container security risk 
evaluation using results from background research, this includes assumptions 
on: 
 data which the customs authority will need to make decisions about 
cargo (e.g. C-TPAT/AEO certificate, x-ray of the container); 
 how the customs authorities process data and how they make decisions 
if data is sufficient for release of cargo into a country or not.  
 Development of a prototype for the application as enhancement to an existing 
SAP solution 
 Evaluation of the concept  
In Chapter 2 “Background Information and Related Work” I outline the most 
important international security regulations which affect international cargo 
transportation. In the same chapter I also describe related projects and discuss how far 
my work builds upon the latest systems already in use. In Chapter 3 “The Concept” I 
present my concept for semi -automatic risk assessment.  In Chapter 4 “Description of 
the Tool” I describe on high level the prototype for risk evaluation tool which was 
developed for evaluation of the concept. I conclude this paper with Chapter 5 
“Evaluation” and Chapter 6 “Summary and Future Work” where I describe evaluation 
of the concept based on use-case, discuss the results and outlook the future work.  
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Chapter 2 
Background Information and Related 
Work 
 
In this chapter I give a brief overview of the ECSIT project in order to outline the 
motivation for creating Container Risk Evaluation Tool. Moreover, I present an 
overview of the international sea freight security regulations. The purpose of my 
research on sea freight legislation is to understand which security criteria can be used for 
container risk evaluation and which information is critical for displaying and analyzing 
in Container Risk Evaluation Tool developed within the project. I also present my 
research on current and finished projects aimed to improve the visibility and security of 
the supply chain which is necessary in order to analyze how far my work enhanced the 
current state of the art. I finish the chapter by discussing existing SAP solutions which 
can be used as a base for development of Container Risk Evaluation Tool. 
2.1 The ECSIT Project 
 
The ECSIT project was initiated as a response to the U.S. “100% scanning” law, or 
House Resolution 1 (H.R. 1), which was adopted by Congress in July 2007. The law is 
an implementation of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States Recommendations, also known as the “9/11 Commission Recommendations”, 
which were set up on November 27, 2002 (Public Law 107-306, November 27, 2002). 
In Section 1701 – “Container scanning and seals” of the Act of 110th Congress of the 
United States, January 4, 2007 it states: “A container that was loaded on a vessel in a 
foreign port shall not enter the United States (either directly or via a foreign port) unless 
the container was scanned by nonintrusive imaging equipment and radiation detection 
equipment at a foreign port before it was loaded on a vessel.” (4).  
One of the technical challenges for the ECSIT project is the development of new 
inspection technology for x-ray and radioactivity integration into harbor procedure, and 
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evaluation how far that can enhance container security. Another challenge is the 
integration of imaging methods for cargo scanning into harbor processes and 
operations. The Container Terminal Bremerhaven in Germany, the fourth largest 
container port in Europe and the largest one in terms of number of containers sent to 
the US in Europe is chosen as a use-case for demonstration of integration of different 
components developed within the ECSIT project. The project team from the SAP 
Research is developing IT system which will support collaboration of different 
stakeholders in transport process and harbor procedures. 
As part of the ECSIT project I have developed a semi-automatic approach for container 
risk assessment, which can be executed e.g. by customs and border control personnel.  
2.2 Legislation 
 
A single international container shipment is affected by various laws of different 
countries and is the responsibility of numerous governmental and nongovernmental 
entities. During transportation the container is subject to business, transportation, 
taxation, customs and security laws, regulations and international agreements. In the 
Master’s Thesis the focus is given to security regulations of sea freight containers, 
perhaps the most “rapidly developing and largely unsettled area of the law” (5). Further 
in this section I will outline the most important international security regulations for sea 
freight, such as the European Authorized Economic Operators (AEO) program, 
American C-TPAT certification, the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) 
Code among others.  
2.2.1 Authorized Economic Operators (AEO) program  
 
AEO is a partnership between companies and customs authorities described by Word 
Customs Organization’s (WCO’s) SAFE Framework of Standards. The SAFE 
Framework of Standards is a set of worldwide security standards for secure international 
trade which focus on three elements: the availability of reliable data, the promotion of 
open standards for new security technologies, as well as mutual recognition of security 
standards and trade partnership programs. The approach used in SAFE standards based 
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on Customs to Customs and Customs to Business cooperation; later is implemented 
through AEO program. The program was launched in January 2008. More than 1700 
European companies were authorized by November 2009 (6).  
Almost all participants of a supply chain can apply for Authorized Economic Operator 
Status: including manufacturers, exporters, freight forwarders, warehouse keepers, 
customs agents, carriers, and importers. The AEO Membership List - a database of 
economic operators holding a valid AEO certificate - can be accessed freely in the 
official website of the European Commission (7). The possession of AEO status 
provides several benefits to its owner:  
 Fewer physical and document-based controls (applied from January 1, 2008) 
 Priority treatment of consignments if selected for control (applied from January 
1, 2008) 
 Choice of the place for controls if it leads to the shorter delay or less costs for 
the AEO (applied from January 1, 2008) 
 Easier admittance to customs simplifications (applied from January 1, 2008) 
 Reduced data set for summary declarations (applied from July 1, 2009) 
 Notification of the place for further physical control prior to the 
arrival/departure of the goods (applied from July 1, 2009) 
 Improved relationship with customs authorities 
 Recognized as a secure and safe business partner 
 Mutual recognition of Authorized Economic Operators. 
According to (8) the criteria for granting the status of Authorized Economic Operator 
include: 
 an appropriate record of compliance with customs requirements, 
 a satisfactory system of managing commercial and, transport records,  - which 
allow appropriate customs controls,  
 proven financial solvency, 
 where applicable, appropriate security and safety standards. 
Security and safety standards are listed in Commission Regulation (EC) No 1192/2008 
of 17 November 2008 (9). In general there are requirements for external boundaries 
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(walls, fences, etc.), access control for premises, security process for goods 
transportation and security screening on prospective and current employees.  
The application for AEO should be submitted to the relevant customs office. There is 
no expiry date on authorization. AEO status can be subject to review in case of major 
changes to the relevant Community legislation or indication that the relevant conditions 
are no longer being met by the AEO. 
At present AEO or similar programs have been introduced in: 
 the United States, under the name of C-TRAT 
  all 27 Member States of the European Union (From May 2008 to February 
2009, relevant monitoring carried out in all 27 Member States confirmed the 
uniform implementation of the AEO in all of those Member States (10)) 
  New Zealand, under the name of Secure Export Scheme (SES) 
  Singapore, under the name of Secure Trade Partnership (STP). 
2.2.2 C-TPAT Certification 
 
C-TPAT is a voluntary government-business initiative for building cooperative 
relationships to protect U.S. borders against terrorism. It was a response from U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), one of the Department of Homeland Security’s 
components, to the events of September, 11. Currently there are more than 10.000 
companies participating in C-TPAT (11). Such companies as U.S. Importers, U.S. 
Customs Brokers, Third Party Logistics (3PL) Providers, Marine Port Authorities & 
Terminal Operators, etc. are eligible to participate in C-TPAT. 
If a company is C-TPAT certified it can get the following benefits (12): 
 A reduced number of CBP inspections; 
 Priority for processing for CBP inspections; 
 Assignment of a C-TPAT Supply Chain Security Specialist (SCSS) who will 
work with the company to help the company satisfy C-TPAT criteria; 
 Eligibility to attend C-TPAT supply chain security training seminars; 
 Access to the C-TPAT Membership List. 
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Requirements for granting C-TPAT certification differ for each type of a company (U.S. 
Importers, U.S. Customs Brokers, Third Party Logistics (3PL) Providers and etc.). In 
general a company should have a business office located and staffed either in the United 
States or Canada and satisfy certain security criteria for: 
 Container Security (for example, all loaded containers bound to the U. S. 
should have a high security seal which must meet or exceed the current PAS 
ISO 17712 standards for high security seals); 
 Container Inspection (for example, a seven-point inspection process is 
recommended for all containers prior to loading with cargo: front wall, left side, 
right side, floor, etc. Moreover, only designated employees should distribute 
container seals for integrity purposes); 
 Physical Access Controls (for example, a company should have an employee 
identification system, visitors must present photo identification for 
documentation purposes upon arrival, etc.) 
 Personnel Security (for example, application information, such as employment 
history and references must be verified prior to employment) 
 Procedural Security (for example, arriving cargo should be reconciled against 
information on the cargo manifest, the cargo should be accurately described, 
and the weights, labels, marks and piece count indicated and verified, drivers 
delivering or receiving cargo must be positively identified before cargo is 
received or released, etc.) 
 Security Training and Threat Awareness (a threat awareness program should 
be established in the company); 
 Physical Security (requirements for fencing, gates and gate houses, parking, 
building structure, locking devices and key controls, lighting and alarm systems 
and video surveillance cameras); 
 Information Technology Security (requirements for password protection and 
accountability). 
 As of June 2011 five Mutual Recognition Arrangements have been signed by CBP: 
 New Zealand Customs Service’s Secure Export Scheme Program; 
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 Canada Border Services Agency’s Partners in Protection Program; 
 Jordan Customs Department’s Golden List Program; 
 Japan Customs and Tariff Bureau’s Authorized Economic Operator Program; 
 Korean Customs Service’s Authorized Economic Operator Program. 
CBP is also currently working with the following Customs Administration with the goal 
of reaching mutual recognition:  
 Singapore Customs - Secure Trade Partnership Plus Program;  
 European Union – Authorized Economic Operator Program.  
2.2.3 Importer Security Filing (ISF) and Additional Carrier 
Requirements  
 
The Importer Security Filing, also known as the “10+2” initiative, is a Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) regulation that requires importers to provide ten data elements 
to CBP as well as two more data elements from the vessel operating carriers 24 hours 
prior to loading. 
For “U.S.-bound” cargo eight data elements should be provided no later than 24 hours 
before the cargo is laden aboard a vessel destined for the United States. Those data 
elements are: 
 Importer of Record Number (it can be an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
number, Employer Identification Number (EIN) or Social Security Number 
(SSN)) 
 Consignee Number (as with the Importer of Record Number it can be Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) number, Employer Identification Number (EIN) or 
Social Security Number (SSN)) 
 Seller (Owner) name/address  
 Buyer (Owner) name/address  
 Ship to Party name/address  
 Manufacturer (Supplier) name/address  
 Country of Origin (country of manufacture, production, or growth of the article, 
based upon the import laws, rules and regulations of the United States) 
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 Commodity Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) 
number, which is a number for determining tariff classifications for goods 
imported into the U.S. 
Two additional data elements must be submitted as early as possible, but no later than 
24 hours prior to the ship’s arrival at a U.S. port. These data elements are: 
 Container stuffing location;  
 Consolidator (Stuffer) name/address. 
Two additional carrier requirements are: 
 Vessel Stow Plan – no later than 48 hours after departure; 
 And Container Status message (CSM) Data – no later than 24 hours after 
creation. 
All data should be submitted electronically via vessel Automated Broker Interface (ABI) 
– a part of the Automated Commercial System (ACS) which is a system used by the U.S. 
Customs Service to track, control and process all commercial goods imported into the 
United States (13). Provided information will be used primarily to identify high-risk 
containerized cargo aboard vessels, for example vessel stow plan will help identify the 
specific physical location of dangerous goods or unmanifested containers prior to arrival 
into the United States. 
2.2.4 The International Convention for the Safety of Life at 
Sea (SOLAS) and Its Amendments   
 
The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) is an international 
maritime safety treaty on minimum security arrangements for ships, ports and 
government agencies. The SOLAS Convention came into force in 1914 in response to 
the sinking of the Royal Mail Ship (RMS) Titanic in the North Atlantic Ocean on 15 
April 1912 after colliding with an iceberg during its voyage from Southampton, UK to 
New York City. Nowadays the SOLAS Convention in its successive forms is considered 
to be the most important of all international treaties concerning the safety of merchant 
ships (14) and many countries have turned these international requirements into their 
national laws.  
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International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code is an amendment to the Safety 
of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention. The ISPS code came into force in 2004 and applies 
to ships on international voyages (including passenger ships, cargo ships of 500 gross 
tonnage and upwards, and mobile offshore drilling units) and the port facilities serving 
such ships (15). The main objectives of the ISPS Code are: 
 Detection of security threats (terrorist attacks); 
 Establishment of roles and responsibilities for maritime security for 
governments, local administrations, ship and port industries etc.; 
 Creation of a methodology for security assessments. 
Because of the many types and sizes of ships and ports the Code does not specify 
measures that each facility must take to ensure safety. Instead it defines requirements 
for security plans, officers, certain onboard equipment – for ships, and ports alike. 
The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (or MTSA), which came into force 
on July 1, 2004, is the U.S. implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility 
Security (ISPS) Code. The act provides a security program for all nation’s ports to better 
identify and prevent terrorism threats.  
2.3 Related Work 
 
Supply chains are becoming more and more sophisticated and global. As a result, 
sharing knowledge and information along the logistics processes is needed to achieve 
transparency, efficiency and security in the supply chain. The role of efficient 
cooperation between the participants of the supply chain is rapidly growing and that 
requires the information and communication systems used for managing transport and 
logistics operation to interact efficiently, whilst both sharing and protecting information. 
In other words information systems should be secure and interoperable so that relevant 
stakeholders can share the information according to their own business rules. To 
develop such systems and concepts many publically funded research activities as well as 
in-house development projects were started.  
In this section existing projects aimed to improve the visibility and security of the 
supply chain will be described. Also included are projects which focus on the efficiency 
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of the supply chain in order to provide an overview of the current situation in supply 
chain management.   
2.3.1 Secure Supply Chain Management - SECURESCM 
 
SecureSCM is partly funded by the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme. 
The project tries to solve the security problems arising while sharing information 
between supply chain partners. These problems prevent the development of 
collaborative supply chain management, as the majority of data accompanying a trade 
transaction is sensitive and supply chain partners are afraid of revealing it due to a high 
risk of unauthorized access. 
As a solution to the problem SecureSCM implemented secure computation protocols 
for collaborative Supply Chain management. In their approach the project team 
implemented and evaluated these protocols using a prototype for data protection in the 
Aerospace and Logistics industry. The application was tested and analyzed within the 
context of supply chain management in the Italian firm Avio Aerospace Propulsion. 
Although the final goal of the project is the same as that of the ECSIT project (to make 
the supply chain more secure and efficient), SecureSCM deals with a different aspect of 
security - information security. SecureSCM improves the security of the supply chain by 
introducing cryptographic protocols to protect data flow in communication between 
supply chain participants, whereas the ECSIT project is aimed to enhance security of 
the physical transportation process. 
2.3.2 Smart Container Chain Management – SMART-CM  
 
SecureSCM The goal of the SMART-CM project is to make supply chains more secure 
and efficient by developing a neutral platform for secure data communication between 
supply chain partners, as well as proposing an information exchange standard (protocol) 
on container security status. 
The project is co-funded through European Union’s Seventh Framework of the 
European Commission and has many partners among terminal and transport operators, 
logistical services providers, customs authorities as well as researchers, consultants and 
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technology providers. Originally the solution was developed for sea freight containers, 
but as it is stated in (16), all findings are “equally applicable to all other forms of surface 
transportation, including road, rail, or barge, and may in the future be applicable to air 
freight transportation”. 
The SMART- CM platform consists of three layers: 
 Information gateway: the entry point for information collection from different 
sources, such as container security tags/e-seals, port Management Information 
Systems (MIS), and fleet management systems. 
 Visibility (infrastructure): the tool for the visualization of the information for 
logistic operators, web-based software. 
 Value added services: this layer provides additional functionality for partners 
of supply chain, based on data collected from the previous two layers (for 
example transportation re-scheduling) (17).  
 
 
Figure 1 SMART-CM Platform (taken from (17)) 
 
One of the possible solutions for SMART-CM platform deployment described in (16) is 
the Global System Architecture currently in use by the Global Data Synchronization 
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Network (GDSN) for data synchronization between a supplier and a customer in the 
Consumer Goods / Retail Industry.  
As a concept the following steps demonstrate how to synchronize data between the 
supplier and retailer platforms: 
 the seller loads data (registers product) into its data pool; 
 part of this data is sent to the Global Registry of an international not-for-profit 
association GS1; 
 the buyer, through its data pool, subscribes to a seller’s product; thanks to the 
GS1 Global Registry, the seller’s data pool with the needed information is 
identified and the request is sent to that data pool;  
 the seller’s data pool publishes the requested information about the product to 
the buyer’s data pool, from where it is then available to the buyer; 
 The buyer sends a confirmation to the seller via their respective data pools 
For the SMART-CM solution this concept can be used in very similar way. The 
Container Security Device (hereinafter - CSD) Provider can play the role of 
“Supply/Seller”, and the SMART-CM platform can be the “Retailer/Buyer”, through 
which the customs authority requests information about the cargo. The “Source Data 
Pool” in this case should be replaced also by SMART-CM platform where the CSD 
sends the required security data. The “Recipient Data Pool” can be again the SMART-
CM platform or another platform, for example a database of Shared Intermodal 
Container Information System (SICIS) which is developed within the INTEGRITY 
project.  The equivalent to “GS1 Global Registry” element does not yet exist in the 
Global Container Security System architecture (18). 
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Figure 2 Model of a Possible Global System Architecture for the Global Container Security 
System (adopted from (16)) 
 
The SMART-CM platform was successfully tested in the Europe-Middle East (EU-ME) 
and Europe-Asia/Pacific (EU-AP) Corridors with help of project partners DHL, K+N, 
and COSCON as well as major port authorities from around the globe such as 
Antwerp, Rotterdam, Singapore, Ningbo, Dubai, and Nhava Sheva. 
Although the approach used in this project is similar to the one used in ECSIT, the x-
ray/3D/radioactivity scanning and container risk evaluation processes are not 
supported by the SMART-CM project. Moreover, the SMART-CM platform was 
intended for the Europe-Middle East and Europe-Asia/Pacific Corridors only.  
 
2.3.3 Intermodal Global Door-to-Door Container Supply 
Chain Visibility – INTEGRITY  
 
The INTEGRITY project tried to solve the problem of rapidly increasing volume of 
global container transport, bottlenecks in sea ports, conforming with new security 
regulations and inconsistent data about cargo through the development of the Shared 
Intermodal Container Information System (SICIS). The project is partly funded by the 
European Union’s Seventh Framework and has partners such as the Institute of 
Shipping Economics and Logistics (ISL), DHL Global Forwarding N.V., and the RSM 
Erasmus University Rotterdam among others. The SICIS platform, as the main 
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deliverable of the project, will allow relevant stakeholders (authorized companies and 
authorities) to access status information of selected transport. This platform matches 
logistical data with security data which comes from electronic seals or other container 
security devices, and provides it to authorized participants of the supply chain.  The 
long term goal of the project is the creation of a “Green lane”, an equivalent of the 
“nothing to declare” green corridor at airports. The project aims to optimize “the 
cooperation between the transport industry and customs authorities in the China-EU 
trade corridor” (19). 
The SICIS system consolidates data from different sources such as the operating 
systems of participating container terminals and the CSDs attached to the container. 
With the second release of SICIS, container logistical data can be also obtained by 
tracking the vessel with help of Automatic Identification System (AIS), which serves to 
identify and locate vessels through the electronic exchange of data with other nearby 
ships and AIS base stations. SICIS provides all this information to authorized 
stakeholders based on a special system of access rights.  
As the authors of the project state, the best level of monitoring can be achieved by 
utilizing CSDs, which can get the container position using GPS and transmit this 
information to SICIS (20), or it can detect the container security status and raise an alert 
if for example the container was opened without authorization. However the system is 
not limited to containers with CSDs – it is still possible to track containers with the 
usual mechanical seals.  
The SICIS platform has a SOA-architecture which allows implementation of interfaces 
to any kind of external data sources, such as terminal operating systems, AIS vessel 
tracking systems, CSD providers, port community systems, factories, and others. 
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Figure 3 SICIS Architecture (taken from (20)) 
 
The SICIS platform cooperates with the SMART-CM platform and the interface 
between these two platforms is currently under development and will facilitate further 
data exchange between different sources. 
The INTEGRITY project closely collaborates with other EU-funded partner projects, 
such as CHINOS, e-Freight, and ITAIDE (see below). Moreover, the SICIS platform is 
a part of the three-year CASSANDRA project, also funded by the EU via its Seventh 
Framework Programme. 
However, the SICIS platform does not provide any tools for container risk evaluation 
process.  
2.3.4 Information Technology for Adoption and 
Intelligent Design for e-Government Project – 
ITAIDE  
 
The ITAIDE Project (Information Technology for Adoption and Intelligent Design for 
e-Government Project) is an EU-funded (Sixth Framework Programme) project aimed 
to improve security and reduce fraud in international trade and logistics. 
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The problem which the ITAIDE project highlights is the trade-off between increasing 
the security in international trade and reducing the administrative work for commercial 
and public administration organizations. The ITAIDE project’s goal is to develop 
technological, procedural and organizational frameworks to simplify taxation processes 
using IT and improve the pan-European interoperability of taxation and customs 
systems. This goal in turn supports the long term objectives of the EU such as the 
introduction of Authorized Economic Operators (AEOs), the concept, according to 
which operators can be accredited by Customs as AEOs if they prove to fulfill all AEO 
requirements for safe and high quality internal processes; and Single Window Access 
service, that will allow all relevant parties to submit standardized information to custom 
authorities through a single entry point (6). The project has partners like the 
Copenhagen Business School, IBM Netherlands, SAP Research, the Danish Customs 
and Tax office, the University of Muenster, Lappeenranta City, the United Nations and 
the Economic Commission for Europe among others. 
The approach of the project includes collaboration of research with business, the design 
and implementation of an information system based on SOA-architecture with 
integration of tamper resistant embedded controller (TREC) devices and Electronic 
Product Code Information Services (EPCIS), and the qualitative evaluation of the 
solution and its usability in Heineken.  For further clarification the TREC is a container 
security wireless monitoring device that can transmit information about the container to 
which it is attached, such as the physical location of the container, its temperature, 
humidity, acceleration and door status (21). EPICS is a standard which defines 
interfaces, discovery services, and security mechanisms for capturing and querying 
Electronic Product Code (EPC) related data (22).  
The solution allows data collection in distributed databases and implementation of 
simple queries such as tracing goods throughout the whole supply chain and finding the 
current location of the container using a given unique consignment reference number.  
The proposed eCustoms model was demonstrated in the Beer Living Lab (BLL) which 
is a pilot project of the ITAIDE project for redesigning EU customs procedures (23), 
and consisted of TREC IBM devices installed on pilot containers. The accompanying 
Shipment Monitoring Services (SMS) aimed to capture and forward events obtained 
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from TRECs, using three distributed EPCIS standard event repositories – one for each 
involved entity: Heineken, the Dutch Customs Authority (DTA) and Safmarine (a 
company which provides container and break-bulk shipping services worldwide), an 
ERP system in Heineken for declaration message generation and three Shipment 
Information Sharing Services (SIS) web portals to search, view and process shipment 
data (24). All these components were bound together in an information system with 
Service Oriented Architecture and tested for interoperability.  
 
 
Figure 4 Architecture of the ITAIDE System (taken from (24)) 
 
The ITAIDE project is an inter-disciplinary project and represents a large amount of 
research conducted in standardization and interoperability areas.    
The project, however, does not support x-ray/3D/radioactivity scanning and does not 
provide any tool for container risk evaluation by customs. 
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2.3.5 European Inter-Disciplinary Research on Intelligent 
Cargo for Efficient, Safe and Environment-Friendly 
Logistics – EURIDICE 
 
EURIDICE is an integrated project funded by the EU's Seventh Framework 
Programme. The project aims to improve logistical performance and make it more 
secure and environmentally friendly through the development and implementation of 
the intelligent cargo concept. The concept includes building the information services 
platform which will allow the interaction of individual cargo items with the surrounding 
environment and relevant users. According to the concept, Intelligent Cargo should 
connect itself to “logistics service providers, industrial users and authorities to exchange 
transport-related information and perform specific services whenever required along the 
transport chain” (25). 
The information service platform which was delivered within the project allows users to 
uphold the network of connected cargo objects (making them identifiable and able to 
communicate), provide basic services, such as querying information about cargo, and 
interoperability for integration with other services. The smart cargo within this 
infrastructure can identify itself, detect the context (its location at every moment), 
monitor its status and detect changes in the goods conditions, for example, change of 
temperature. Finally, based on obtained information, the cargo can act independently, 
for example alert the owner that its current position is different from the planned 
location. 
The EURIDICE system is highly distributed and consists of two physical areas: the 
“fixed platform”, representing the “server” part, and “mobile device” which is simply all 
mobile devices connected to the system. The fixed platform communicates with the 
mobile devices through Software Agent architecture based on FIPA specifications, 
which is a collection of standards for promoting the interoperation of agents and the 
services that they can represent. External applications (developed and maintained by 
external stakeholders) interact with the platform also via Web Services, while object 
discovery systems along with event and cargo master data are provided by a part of the 
EURIDICE system which implements the ONS/EPCIS standard. As it was mentioned 
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above, the Electronic Product Code Information Services (EPCIS) is a standard that 
defines interfaces for the sharing of data among trading partners. The function of the 
Object Name Service (ONS) is to transform the EPC stored, for example, on RFID-
Tags, via their corresponding Identity URI encodings into URLs, which may 
respectively point to a Web Service or other information resource (26). 
The distribution of the system is achieved by deployment of software components on 
mobile devices which are attached to vehicles, containers, terminals, etc. Some of the 
mobile devices can act only as sensors for detection of other mobile devices (for 
example devices installed in marine port terminals), while others can process their data 
before sending the results to the system (for example, CSDs installed on the container). 
All implemented services are deployed as Web Services and can be accessed by other 
services, applications and agents according to the security specifications. 
Communication within the agents happens through the FIPA ACL (FIPA Agent 
Communication Language) Message protocol, developed by Foundation for Intelligent 
Physical Agents. 
As the EURIDICE system is highly distributed, event and object meta data is physically 
stored in several databases owned by the different organizations which participate in the 
supply chain and can be accessed via interfaces defined by Event Meta Information and 
Discovery Services.  
For interoperability between different ERP systems of the supply chain participants the 
EURIDICE knowledge model is implemented in an ontology format. In additional to 
interoperability between ERP systems, the EURIDICE knowledge base set of 
ontologies and rules allows the intelligent cargo to do reasoning, context detection, and 
data mining tasks of trend detection.  
Special adapter for legacy system should be installed on stakeholder site to make data 
available for the EURIDICE system. This adapter can consist of an EPCIS component 
for exposing stakeholder business domain data and an Identity provider component for 
stakeholder authentication in the EURIDICE system without duplicating the 
information.  
The EURIDICE infrastructure was tested in eight pilot scenarios, each of them 
demonstrating the system benefits in specific business contexts including: cargo 
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transportation, cooperative warehousing through cargo-centric information services, 
self-returning empty pallets and boxes, and automated billing of goods in transit among 
others. Benefits include real time detection of exceptions which can be triggered by 
cargo as a result of deviation from the defined route, time, or physical condition of the 
goods with respect to the distributor’s order, better planning based on information 
about deviations, minimization of human error, etc. 
The EURIDICE project cooperates with the previously discussed SMART-CM and an 
interface between the two platforms can be developed. The SMART-CM platform can 
pull data from EURIDICE to collect information about intelligent cargo positions. At 
the same time the SMART-CM platform can also provide data from CSDs to the   
EURIDICE platform.  
The EURIDICE platform brings innovation to shipment monitoring services with help 
of CSDs but does not provide neither collaboration between entities in the supply chain 
nor a tool for risk evaluation process of obtained data. 
2.3.6 Common Assessment and Analysis of Risk in Global 
Supply Chains – CASSANDRA 
 
The CASSANDRA is co-funded by European Commission within its Seventh 
Framework a follow up to the INTEGRITY, ITAIDE and SMART-CM project. The 
INTEGRITY project uses trade lanes from China to Europe to evaluate the 
functionality of the SICIS system - CASSANDRA adapts this approach and extends the 
scope to trade lanes from Europe to the US.  
The CASSANDRA research problem has been formulated as follows: “How to 
integrate existing commercial supply chain visibility solutions and data capture 
technologies across supply chains to enhance risk assessment and to enable the 
adoption of a risk based approach to supply chain management for both private sector 
companies and government authorities?” (27).  
The goal of the project is to enhance the visibility of supply chain management and 
cooperation between all involved parties by developing a new data sharing concept, the 
so-called “data pipeline”, which will connect existing information sources in the supply 
chain. Moreover in order to improve the efficiency of government agencies the 
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CASSANDRA project will design and implement a new approach for risk assessment 
based on information obtained from the whole supply chain. The combination of a new 
Risk Based Approach (RBA) and the data pipeline concept will be demonstrated and 
evaluated in the following three global trade lanes: China-Europe, Europe-USA and 
Europe-Africa.  
2.3.7 Robust and Available SCM - Support IT Platform – 
RescueIT  
 
RescureIT (Robust and available SCM - Support IT platform) is a European project 
which aims to develop a distributed, service-based IT infrastructure to make the supply 
chain more secure and transparent. The difference between this project and the ECSIT 
is that the RescueIT system is intended to monitor fresh food products, by measuring 
temperature, pressure, etc. The project scenario is the protection of fresh food products 
during the logistical process from production to the consumer. The core of the 
RescureIT platform is the risk database, within which existing standards and regulations 
can be mapped. The criteria for risk evaluation used in the RescureIT project are 
different from those used in ECSIT: they are based on the physical qualities of fresh 
food products. 
2.3.8 Management Framework for Intelligent Intermodal 
Transport– FREIGHTWISE 
 
The FRIGHTWISE project, co-funded by the European Commission through its Sixth 
Framework, aims to simplify the existing complexity of intermodal (multimodel) 
transport management. Developed based on previous European and national efforts, it 
is intended to simplify the procedure of supply chain planning and choosing available 
transport services for any type of cargo. The FRIGHTWISE Framework should achieve 
a high quality of collaboration and allow standardization across different transport 
modes (28).  
The FRIGHTWISE Framework is based on the reference model from the Norwegian 
project ARKTRANS and consists of four roles (Transport User, Transport Service 
Provider, Transport Regulator and Transport Network Manager); three business phases 
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(Planning, Execution, and Completion), Information Packages (messages exchanged by 
the roles: Transport Service Description, Transport Execution Plan, etc.) and processes 
for the transport chain. For example, the Transport Service Provider can describe its 
services by publishing “Transport Service Description” (TSD) that contains specific 
information on the single transport service. The TSD is a standard XML file that can be 
reached by the Transport User through a browser or suited application (28). The 
framework allows the Transport Service Providers to advertise their services in an 
agreed format while Transport Users can search among transport services and negotiate 
details.  
The previously discussed SMART-CM platform can use the XML format developed 
within the FREIGHTWISE project for transportation planning. In particular SMART-
CM relies on Transport Execution Plan (TEP) and Transport Service Description 
(TSD) messages.   
2.3.9 E-Freight 
 
The co-funded via Seventh Framework Programme European project E-Freight can be 
considered as a continuation of the FREIGHTWISE project. The project objectives are 
to establish open freight transport e-market places to enable transport users to easily 
find and use direct or combined transport services suitable for their purpose. Moreover 
by developing “a single transport document in electronic form” (electronic waybill) the 
project aims to implement the concept of “single window”, according to which all 
relevant parties can submit standardized information to custom authorities through a 
single entry point (29). 
The E-Freight concept includes following components: 
 e-Freight Framework – a reference model for information exchange among 
participants of the supply chain; 
 e-Freight Platform – a software infrastructure for e-Freight Framework 
implementation and e-Freight Solutions deployment; 
 e-Freight Services – pieces of software used as elementary blocks for e-Freight 
Solutions; 
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 e-Freight Solutions - applications that perform meaningful functions in the 
area of Freight Transport & Logistics. 
The e-Freight concept is depicted in figure below. 
 
 
Figure 5 The e-Freight Concept (taken from (30)) 
 
The e-Freight Framework serves as a reference model to support paperless information 
exchange between all stakeholders in Freight Transport and Logistics. “The e-Freight 
Framework is in line with the Common Framework developed as a joint effort between 
the projects FREIGHTWISE, e-Freight, INTEGRITY, SMART-CM, EURIDICE, 
SMARTFREIGHT and DiSCwise and is a description of processes, actors, information 
and other domain entities” (30). To ensure interoperability the e-Freight project works 
closely with standardization organization GS1.  
The core e-Freight solutions are: 
 Next Generation National Single Window (NGNSW): an application which 
represents a single entry point for the submission of all relevant transport 
documents in a standardized format. 
 Central EU National Single Windows’ Support Services: an application 
which holds the registry of all NGNSWs; it facilitates the information exchange 
through NGNSW and aims to provide statistical and data services. 
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 Collaborative Security Risk Management: an application that provides 
relevant stakeholders (logistics companies, suppliers, customs authorities, etc.)  
with real time tracking of trucks and vessels and security risk information 
sharing. 
 Monitoring of Transport Services Execution: an application for transport 
services status monitoring and detection of deviations from the defined 
transport plan. 
 Co-modal Shipment Planning: an application helping transport clients in 
specifying and negotiating the terms of transportation. 
 Single Transport Document: an application for the generation of electronic 
transport Document (waybills) from existing operational data, based on a 
common standardized scheme.   
According to the concept a National Single Window could be a single system at a 
National level. The system should collect information from relevant stakeholders and 
make this information available for authorized users within the country. For example 
this system can be a Maritime National Single Window, an EU initiative for a system 
which collects relevant information from businesses in the maritime domain and 
presents it to administrations, such as Port Authorities and National Maritime 
Authorities. Similarly, a Customs National Single Window is a system which allocates 
goods related information.  Many countries already started to develop these kinds of 
National Windows. The current problem which the e-Freight project aims to solve is 
the lack of information exchange between these National systems. The project develops 
a “multimodal Single Window concept to facilitate exchange of electronic regulatory 
information, and which will satisfy the requirements of stakeholders in all transport 
modes.” (31). 
Initially the prototype for National Single Window was a centralized system but after a 
demonstration to the user community the approach was shifted to the development of a 
distributed application due to the problem of system ownership and the devastating 
effect it would have if a central reporting facility is compromised with regard to security. 
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2.3.10 Container Handling in Intermodal Nodes – Optimal 
and Secure – CHINOS 
 
CHINOS, a European project co-funded through its Sixth Framework, has as its 
objective to provide more reliable data on the state of containers from a logistical and 
security point of view.  
The project tackles the following problems in the current situation: 
 Commercial: the rapidly increasing volume of container traffic being handled 
in ports; 
 Legal/Security: the growth in new security regulations for fighting against 
terrorism; 
 Technical: the problem of integrating new technologies, such as RFID 
transponders, and combining them with existing classical bolt seals. 
The system delivered within the project encompasses the latest technologies available 
on the market and provides information about the security status of the container such 
as identification, seal condition and damage documentation. The CHINOS system has 
four components: 
 an automatic container identification unit (ACIU) consisting of a container 
identification system (CIS) and an electronic seal system (e-seal) which uses 
RFID; 
 a damage documentation system (DDS) which uses high-resolution cameras; 
 a chain event manager (CEM) which uses a supply chain event management 
approach;  
 a communication controller (CC) which integrates different components. 
Although most of the hardware components already exist, they are not integrated into a 
single system and some modifications and specially designed interface software was 
needed in order to build such a system. 
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Figure 6 CHINOS System Architecture (taken from (32)) 
 
The system was installed and tested in different locations:  in a large sea port in the 
North Sea (Bremerhaven), a medium-sized port in the Mediterranean (Thessaloniki), 
and terminals/freight villages in Poland (Pruszków) and Austria (Graz). 
 
2.4 SAP Solutions 
 
In this section I present my research on existing SAP solutions for supply chain 
management. The purpose of the research is to understand functionality available and 
use this information for development of the prototype for a Container Risk Evaluation 
Tool that builds upon the current state of the art. 
2.4.1 SAP Global Trade Services  
 
SAP Global Trade Services (SAP GTS) is a part of the SAP BusinessObjects 
Governance, Risk and Compliance (SAP BusinessObjects GRC) solution, which also 
includes components such as Access Control, Process Control, Risk Management and 
Note Fiscal Electronica.  SAP GTS is based on an application server from SAP AG - 
SAP Web Application Server 6.20/6.40 - and can be connected to both SAP and non-
SAP feeder systems (33). The main purpose of SAP GTS is to automate global trade 
processes, help users work with huge numbers of documents and comply with legal 
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regulations, such as International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), AEO program, 
REACH Regulation, etc. 
SAP GTS can be deployed as a stand-alone application for consolidated foreign trade 
activities or as a co-deployment on the hub of several SAP GRC solutions, for example 
Nota Fiscal Electronica (NFE) or Process Control/Risk Management (PC/RM). For 
small businesses SAP GTS can be installed as a co-deployment on ERP for global trade 
processes in a simple landscape. 
 
Figure 7 SAP GTS Deployment Options. Picture is taken from (34). 
From left to right: SAP GTS Stand-Alone Hub, SAP GTS Co-Deployment and SAP GTS Co-
Deployment for small businesses. Here, SAP TM stands for SAP Transport Management, SAP 
ECC – SAP Enterprise Central Component (SAP ERP), SCM – SAP Supply Chain Management 
solution – a part of SAP Business Suite  
 
SAP GTS has four modules: 
 SAP Compliance Management - the part of the system, responsible for 
export and import legal control and sanctioned party list screening (checks 
against boycott lists issued by governments containing companies with which 
trade is prohibited by law); 
 SAP Customs Management - the component responsible for transit 
procedures, customs processing, printing of trade documents and customs 
communications; 
 SAP Risk Management, - the component used for preference processing, 
letter of credit processing and restitution; 
 SAP Electronic Compliance Reporting – the component which is 
responsible for intrastat declarations: documents containing certain information 
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which a company in European Union is obliged to declare if it trades with other 
members of European Union. 
 SAP GTS can be integrated with logistics, sales, and finance processes of the SAP ERP 
system. For example, in the Customs Management component of SAP GTS it is 
possible to create customs declarations prior to goods receipt and perform a preliminary 
customs duty calculation based on purchase order from SAP ERP. For customs export 
processing SAP GTS can be integrated with SAP Transportation Management (SAP 
TM) – which is a solution from SAP for planning, execution and controlling the 
physical movements of goods. This allows the creation of export declarations based on 
freight orders from SAP TM. Some information such as nationality of the means of 
transport crossing the border, nationality of the inland means of transport, invoice value 
(net value), packaging data, dangerous goods number, etc. can be uploaded to SAP GTS 
system from SAP TM. SAP GTS can be also integrated with the SAP Environment, 
Health, and Safety Management (SAP EHS Management) application for compliance 
with Registration, Evaluation, Authorization, and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) 
Regulation. 
SAP GTS helps companies comply with: 
 “10+2” Importer Security Filling (ISF) – a new rule which requires importers 
to electronically submit 10 data elements to U. S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) department, as well as the carrier – to submit 2 more data 
elements. This data should be provided at least 24 hours before goods are 
loaded onto an ocean vessel for shipment into the U.S. SAP GTS tracks all 
relevant fields of documents in the system and automatically prepopulates forms 
for Importer Security Filling regulation. Data for ISF can be provided only via 
automated electronic means. U. S. Customs and Border Protection suggests that 
data should be filed via the Automated Broker Interface (ABI) – a component 
of the U.S. Customs Service's Automated Commercial System that permits 
qualified participants to electronically file required import data with Customs 
(13).   SAP GTS is an ABI-certified solution which allows the direct submission 
of data from the system to CBP.  
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 International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) – a set of United States 
government regulations that controls the export of military equipment, services 
and technology which are included in the United States Munitions List (USML). 
SAP GTS helps to classify products in the system by assigning them their 
USML numbers, automatically blocks relevant transaction where items require 
special license, and maintains audit trail for inspection when requested by 
authorities.  
 AEO - an authorized economic operator, a status for European based company 
which meets requirements for safe and secure internal processes. This status 
allows the company to conduct simplified electronic processing within the 
shortest possible timeframe. SAP GTS along with SAP Risk Management helps 
to meet these requirements by supporting supply chain risk management (35). 
 REACH Regulation – Registration, Evaluation, Authorization, and Restriction 
of Chemicals Regulations is the European Union Regulation for the production 
and use of chemical substances. Compliance can be achieved by integrating SAP 
GTS with SAP ERP and SAP EHS Management. The results of compliance 
checks in SAP EHS Management are transferred to SAP GTS, where items get 
special statuses in relevant documents (35). SAP GTS can ban the 
import/export of substances from/to specific countries, and automatically 
check for quantity restrictions of substances in import/export-relevant 
documents. 
2.4.2 SAP Investigative Case Management for Public 
Sector 
 
SAP Investigative Case Management (SAP ICM) is a solution for the Public Sector 
which supports police and other investigating authorities in the prevention, detection 
and investigation of crime. It is intended to provide an investigative platform for end-
to-end investigation lifecycle support. SAP ICM runs on top of SAP Customer 
Relationship Management 7.0 (SAP CRM 7.0) –software for managing a company’s 
interactions with customers.  
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The solution is able to integrate information from different systems and databases, 
giving users a profound picture of the investigative lifecycle. It supports advanced 
workflow and scheduling capabilities which minimize administrative work. SAP ICM 
can also be integrated with tools for data visualization and text analysis. For example, 
text analysis tools from the SAP BusinessObjects portfolio can extract, categories and 
summarize text information from a wide range of document types (36). 
SAP ICM supports such security mechanisms as single sign-on, role-based 
authorization, central user management, secure information exchange with encryption, 
public key infrastructure support and secure document exchange with digital signature. 
Main entities in SAP ICM are Case, Lead, Location, Object, Person and Organization, 
Incident, and Activity. It is possible to create associations between entity data using 
Relationship and rate the reliability level of data using a Reliability Matrix. Case can be 
an object, a crime or offence under police investigation. This object is used to group 
related entities into a single, central access point for investigators (37). Lead is an 
observation of the police that can be connected to the crime. A case can be created 
from a lead if an offence has been committed. Activity is a task that can be performed 
by an employee of law enforced agency. Incident is an observation which is relevant for 
some investigative work. An incident and the associated data can be bounded into one 
lead or case.  Person and Organization are those parties that are the focus of policing 
activities and investigative cases. They can be suspects, victims, witnesses or criminal 
organizations. 
 
Figure 8. Main Entities, Relationships and activities of SAP ICM. Picture is taken from (37)  
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SAP ICM can be used in integration with SAP Defense Forces & Public Security when 
investigating complex criminal activities or during resource planning. 
With SAP ICM it is possible to gain a single, complete, real-time view of the case, track 
the suspects and witnesses, manage case activities and access to the documents, search 
in the content of documents related to a case, easily analyze all case-related data and 
generate reports. 
2.4.3 SAP Transportation Management  
 
SAP Transportation Management (SAP TM) is a solution from SAP which aims to help 
companies organize and track the physical transportations of goods.  SAP TM allows 
the creation of forwarding orders and freight bookings based on information from 
feeder systems, the planning and monitoring of the transportation, the calculating of 
transportation charges and compliance with foreign trade and dangerous goods 
regulations.  
SAP TM can be used as a stand-alone application but it brings most benefit when it is 
installed together with SAP ERP Central Component (SAP ECC 6.0) for end-to-end 
process integration. For example, shipment (or transportation) requests can be 
generated based on transportation orders from SAP ERP. Moreover, SAP TM can be 
integrated also with following SAP solutions: 
SAP Global Trade Services (SAP GTS) - for customs and compliance management. In 
SAP GTS relevant export declarations can be generated based on information from 
freight orders in SAP TM. 
SAP Event Management (SAP EM), a SAP solution for managing activities within and 
between companies, - for event notifications and event handling during the 
transportation of goods. 
SAP Environment, Health, and Safety Management (SAP EHS Management) - for 
dangerous goods handling, which is regulated by numerous laws and regulations, such 
as special requirements for receiving goods and goods issue processes, storage, labeling 
and printouts.  
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This process integration supports visibility and transparency for both global and 
domestic shipping, allow a company optimize and enhance its transportation 
management processes and make better business decisions. 
2.4.4 SAP Auto-ID Enterprise  
 
SAP Auto-ID Enterprise (38) is a solution for serialization of information in a wide 
variety of supply chain, manufacturing, service, etc. and comprises two products: the 
SAP Auto-ID Infrastructure (SAP AII) and SAP Object Event repository. SAP Auto-
ID Enterprise supports technologies such as linear bar codes, RFID tags, sensors, etc. 
and support standard-based serialization such as Electronic product Code or EPC, a 
standard used to track the progress of objects as they move through the supply chain 
(22). 
SAP Object Event Repository is the repository which allows capturing, storage and 
querying data about uniquely identified objects. It is implemented together with multiple 
instances of SAP Auto-ID (SAP automatic-identification) infrastructure as part of SAP 
Auto-ID Enterprise. SAP Auto-ID is networked infrastructure that can acquire, filter, 
aggregate, store and publish massively high volumes of real-time Auto-ID information 
from electronically tagged items (e. g. a bar code, or RFID tag), sensors and global 
positioning systems (GPS). Auto-ID is integrated as an information service in SAP 
NetWeaver as part of the information integration layer. To monitor information from 
tagged items, SAP Auto-ID uses the Electronic Product Code (EPC), which is attached 
to every physical object of interest and uniquely identifies this object.  
Automatic monitoring of events, setting up alerts and exception management scenarios 
happens in SAP Object Event Repository through use of SAP Event Management (39) 
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Chapter 3 
The Concept  
 
In the following chapter I present the concept for container risk evaluation process. I 
describe the main steps of the process as well as discuss reasons for the chosen design. 
3.1 Definition of the Problem 
 
As a part of the ECSIT project the overall goal of my Master’s Thesis is to make the 
supply chain of containerized cargo more secure, efficient and effective. With 
introduction of House Resolution 1 (or “100% scanning law”) marine ports face a big 
problem of increased workload and scanning of every container may lead to 
unacceptable bottle-necks in their work. 
Every day Customs Authorities process a huge amount of data in order to decide which 
sea containers can cross the border and which cannot. The correct decision must be 
made quickly and at low cost. At the same time legislation for international trade is 
constantly changing with governments introducing more laws and regulations.  
It is against this backdrop that I address in my Master’s Thesis the uncertainties 
presented, in particular: 
 which exact information is needed for container risk evaluation; 
 how this information can be evaluated; 
 how to integrate the risk evaluation process into the supply chain. 
 
The problem of possible industry espionage that can occur as a result of sharing security 
related supply chain data is not the focus of this Master’s Thesis. The problem is 
described in greater detail in Chapter 5 “Evaluation”.  
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3.2 The Risk Evaluation Process 
 
The process of container risk evaluation which I suggest in my Master’s Thesis is semi-
automatic. It means that part of the process can be done automatically according to the 
algorithm implemented in the prototype developed within the project while another part 
can only be processed manually.  The reason for this particular design is that although 
human errors can be minimized and speed at which data is analyzed by implementing 
algorithms increased, the final decision about the container should only be made by an 
authorized member of the customs authorities. 
The process of analyzing data for deciding if a certain container can be released into the 
US is time consuming since customs authorities have to check a lot of information. At 
the same time marine ports such as Port of Bremerhaven handle around 54.7 million 
tons of containerized cargo annually (data for the Port of Bremerhaven, 2008 (40)). 
Taking into account substantial volumes of the US bound cargo involved the necessity 
to scan every container can lead to unacceptable bottle-necks in the work of marine 
ports. In the process of Container Risk Evaluation developed within the ECSIT project 
I suggest an alternative for the “100% scanning” law: after automatic thorough analysis 
of all relevant information for container security available for the customs authorities, 
the container is sent for scanning only if some security issues were discovered by the 
system during its transportation. Security alerts from the system can be raised if for 
example the container seal was opened during the transportation or one of the carriers 
is not AEO/C-TPAT certified.  
In the ECSIT project we assume that the port has an x-ray gate at the entrance to the 
harbor for initial scanning while the container is entering the harbor as well as another 
inside the harbor for further scanning if needed.  
The process of Container Risk Evaluation can be divided into three phases:  
 Automatic capturing of data by the system during packing and transportation of 
the container from the manufacturer to the entrance of the last foreign port 
before loading onto vessel bound for the USA; 
 Automatic analysis of all incidents that could have happened during the 
previous phase in order to decide if the container should be scanned or not (the 
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subprocess which takes place while the container is waiting for permission to 
enter the harbor); 
 Manual analysis of scan images and all incidents that happened with the 
container during its transportation to the harbor entrance (the subprocess takes 
place when the container is inside the harbor).  
The process is different when the container cannot be scanned or if no incidents 
occurred during its transportation to the harbor entrance: details are described later in 
this section. The process is represented at the high level in the picture below: 
 
 
Figure 9 Three Steps of the Process 
 
In the following sections I describe the main steps of the process, the types of data 
which should be collected for the Container Risk Evaluation process and finally, give 
several examples of possible systems alerts. 
3.2.1 Automatic Capturing of Data   
 
The process starts with the automatic capturing of relevant security data and uploading 
it to an IT system for evaluation. Data such as supplier ID, buyer ID, container ID, 
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container parameters, port of landing, etc. is first gathered when the container is packed 
at the loading area by the supplier. All data which feeds into the system is automatically 
checked for completeness, compliance and against criteria detailing prohibited cargo, 
terrorist organizations, and economic and political embargoes. If the data is incomplete, 
a request for additional information is sent automatically. These steps of the process are 
executed during the transportation of the container to the last port before loading onto 
a vessel bound for the USA. 
 
 
Figure 10 Automatic capturing of data  
 
The main steps of the process are not strictly tied to the data which should be captured 
during the transportation of the cargo. The parameters according to which data is 
checked as well as the sort of data can be easily adjusted to the current law or customs 
authorities’ needs. Later I describe data which the Container Risk Evaluation Tool 
captures for automatic analysis of the risk. 
3.2.2 Data for Capturing  
 
There are several European and international regulations which oblige supply chain 
actors to submit certain data as part of declaration for international transportation of 
cargo. 
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The European Commission regulation No 1875/2006 amending Regulation (EEC) No 
2454/93 provides provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2913/92 which lists requirements for entry and exit summary declarations.  The annex 
30A in the regulation contains the detailed data elements that must be provided as part 
of the summary declarations for all goods entering and leaving the customs territory of 
the EU. 
The table below is adopted from (41) and displays the required data elements. The table 
excludes situations when participants of the supply chain have Authorized Economic 
Operator (AEO) status, in which case the number of data requirements is reduced. 
Table does not present requirements for postal, road and rail modes of transportation 
either. “Item level” indicates an element that is requested at the declaration item of 
goods level, “header level” indicates an element which is required at declaration header 
level and “cons. level” - a data element which must be submitted on a consignment 
level. 
Name Exit summary 
declaration 
Entry summary 
declaration 
Number of items header level header level 
Unique consignment reference number  item/header level item/header level 
Transport document number item/header level item/header level 
Consignor item/header level item/header level 
Person lodging the summary declaration header level header level 
Consignee item/header level item/header level 
Carrier  cons. level 
Notify party  item/header level 
Identity and nationality of active means of 
transport crossing the border 
 cons. level 
Conveyance reference number  cons. level 
First place of arrival code  cons. level 
Date and time of arrival at the first place of 
arrival in Customs territory 
 cons. level 
Country(ies) of routing codes header level header level 
Customs office of exit  header level  
Location of goods header level  
Place of loading 
 
 
 item/header level 
Place of unloading code  item/header level 
Goods description item level item level 
Type of packages (code) item level item level 
Number of packages item level item level 
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Shipping marks item/header level item/header level 
Equipment identification number, if 
containerized 
item/header level item/header level 
Goods item number item level item level 
Commodity code  item level item level 
Gross mass (kg) item/header level item/header level 
UN Dangerous Goods code item level item level 
Seal number 
 
item/header level item/header level 
Transport charges method of payment code item/header level item/header level 
Declaration date  header level header level 
Signature/Authentication header level header level 
Other specific circumstance indicator header level header level 
 
Table 1 ICS/ECS data elements  
 
According to the Importer Security Filing (ISF) or “10+2” rule the following data must 
be provided to the customs authorities before the cargo is laden aboard a vessel 
destined for the United States: 
Importer of Record Number – as it was explained earlier in the Chapter 3 
Background Information and Related Work, it can be an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
number, Employer Identification Number (EIN) or Social Security Number (SSN); 
Consignee number - if the deliver-to is other than the importer of record, it is the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) number, Employer Identification Number (EIN) or 
Social Security Number (SSN); 
Seller (Owner) name/address – as it is explained in the ISF Regulation, it is the 
name/ address of the last known entity by whom the goods are sold; 
Buyer (Owner) name/address – the name of the owner of the goods, it can be the 
same as Seller ISF-10 data element; 
Ship to name and address - the name and address of the first deliver-to party 
scheduled to physically receive the goods after the goods have been released from 
customs custody (CBP requires the actual name/address, not the corporate address); 
Manufacturer (Supplier) name/address - the name and address of the organization 
that last manufactured, assembled, produced, or grew the commodity, or the name and 
address of the supplier of the finished goods in the country from which the goods are 
leaving; 
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Country of origin - country of origin specified for each article in the shipment; 
Commodity HTS-6 - 6-digit HTS number for each article in shipment, the 
Commodity Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) number must 
be provided in the six-digit format, and is used for determining tariff classifications for 
goods imported into the US. 
Two more data elements are needed to be provided as early as possible, but no later 
than 24 hours prior to the ship’s arrival at a U. S. port: Container Stuffing location 
and Consolidator name/address.  
The set of data described above is considered to be the “Cargo Details” category of 
information available for customs authorities according to the Container Risk 
Evaluation Tool terminology.  
For risk evaluation it is vital to collect data about the seal of the container. Nowadays 
simple bolt seals are the most often used for shipping containers, but in the concept I 
assume that electronic smart seals, which allow data exchange with backend systems and 
record opening and closing of the container are used. Data from electronic seal helps to 
analyze all accidents which might happen with the container during its transportation, 
for example, unauthorized opening of the container in an attempt to smuggle goods. 
For reliability analysis of the participants of the corresponding supply chain it is useful 
to capture the data about their possession of relevant certificates/statuses, such as 
AEO status or C-TPAT certification.  
Moreover within the ECSIT project it is possible to collect certain logistical 
information of the container such as the GPS coordinates of business location where 
the container was recorded by RFID/bar code readers, as well as time stamp of the 
corresponding event.  
Information about the cargo can be obtained by customs authorities from three main 
sources: 
 other authorities (domestic or foreign); 
 supply chain participants -  information can be provided before, during and after 
the physical flow of the cargo; 
 external sources, i.e. third party sources such as media or individual citizens, as 
suggested by CASSANDRA in (41). 
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More detailed they are depicted in the figure below:  
 
Figure 11 Main sources of information about the container 
 
Some of required data is collected from various governmental organizations. In general 
it can be authorities that issue different licenses, permits and certificates. In most cases 
such organizations maintain electronic databases of certified operators. For example the 
database of Authorized Economic Operators can be found in (7). 
Supply chain participants mainly exporters, importers and carriers are obliged by law to 
submit a certain data to customs authorities. If cargo is intended for the United States a 
certain data must be submitted to U.S. customs authorities before the cargo is laden 
aboard a vessel destined for the United States (the Importer Security Filing law). In EU 
territory the Import Control System (ICS) obliges carriers to submit pre-arrival 
information for all cargo entering EU territory for shipment risk analysis purposes. The 
Import Control System (ICS) is an electronic security declaration management system 
for the transportation of goods into the European Union customs territory. Detailed 
information must be provided in the form of an Entry Summary Declaration (ESD) 
that includes information about “contents of cargo, planned routing and traders 
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involved with the movement of the goods” (42). For containerized maritime cargo, this 
information must be submitted 24 hours before loading at the port of origin. A 
complete list of ICS/ECS data is shown in Table 1 of this paper. 
Third parties can also provide information which can be relevant for risk evaluation; 
they can be informants or companies specializing in risk-related information and data 
collection. 
Sources where information about the cargo and supply chain partners can be fed into 
the system for container risk evaluation are described later in this chapter in section 
“Integration of the Container Risk Evaluation Process with the Secure Supply Chain 
Process Supported by the ECSIT Infrastructure”.  
3.2.3 Automatic Analysis of Incidents   
 
For efficient process implementation the decision about container scanning should be 
ready by the time when container arrives to the harbor. As it was mentioned above only 
containers with suspicious supply chain participants or raised security alerts based on 
analysis of the container’s route and seal log have to be sent for scanning or manual 
check while entering the harbor. Other containers can enter the harbor without 
scanning and can be released without further inspection. The diagram below shows the 
process flow and a detailed description of the second phase of the process follows after. 
 
Figure 12 Automatic analysis of incidents 
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As soon as the container arrives at the harbor entrance the system decides whether it 
must be sent for detailed inspection. The decision is made automatically based on 
general data about the supply chain partners such as name, address, and certifications as 
well as all incidents which occurred during the transport, e.g. unauthorized opening of 
the container seal or deviation from the defined route. Not all system alerts are caused 
by criminal action connected to the container: for example the seal of the container can 
be opened for random inspection during the transportation but the automatic check of 
seal log can raise an incident in this case. The reason for that is the fact that customs 
authorities need to be absolutely sure about the container which enters the harbor 
without any detailed inspection as it is possible green line scenario: the container should 
not carry anything suspicious.  
A detailed inspection of the container includes x-ray container scanning, scanning for 
nuclear materials or radiation or manually inspection if the cargo cannot be scanned. If 
there are no suspicious incidents the system can decide to release the cargo without 
inspection. 
The automatic container risk evaluation process is based on an analysis of data 
categories such as Cargo Details, Cargo Route, Scan Result and Seal Log, which are 
described below. 
Cargo Details. Data which is provided within the Cargo Details category as it was 
mentioned above, mainly data from the Importer Security Filing (ISF) data elements, 
provides information about supply chain participants. This data allows checking 
business partners against database of terrorist organizations, economic and political 
embargoes. Based on this data the system can check if all supply chain participants are 
trusted organizations, e. g. they have AEO status, C-TPAT certificate or equivalent.  
Later information from the Cargo Details category, such as Commodity HTS Number, 
HazMat Code, and cargo description from the Cargo Manifest can be used by customs 
authorities during the analysis of results from x-ray scan or manual check. 
Cargo Route. The idea of the automatic cargo route analysis is to monitor for deviation 
from the planned route or suspicious stops during which manipulation with the 
container can occur or unauthorized seal opening can occur. The information about the 
route can be obtained with the help of RFID and GPS Tracking Devices attached to the 
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container. The information about unauthorized opening of the container can be derived 
through the seal log provided by container’s electronic seal.  
By analyzing the cargo route several scenarios can be implemented. Below I describe 
some of them. 
Scenario 1. One scenario can be the comparison by the system of the actual and 
planned cargo routes. This is possible to implement if a company responsible 
for the container transportation has provided a transport plan to the customs 
authorities. In this case the time threshold should be set in the system after 
which the system should compare the real GPS coordinates of the container 
with the ones listed in the plan as well as the time when the container appeared 
there. It is obvious than an 100% match is impossible even if the container 
followed the planned route but a time frame can be set up within which the 
deviation is not considered to be critical. 
Scenario 2. Another scenario can be the use of a geo-fence. A geo-fence is a 
virtual perimeter for a real world geographical area. It allows the drawing of 
zones around places and triggering alerts in software where the geo-fence was 
implemented if borders of these zones were crossed.  
 
Figure 13 Example of geo-fence (taken from (43)) 
 
While planning the container route the transportation company can set a geo-
fence for the container. With the help of GPS Tracking Devices attached to the 
container any crossing of the geo-fence can be easily detected and recorded. 
Later this data should be provided to Container Risk Evaluation Tool where it 
will raise system alerts. 
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Scenario 3. The simplest scenario can be the analysis of all planned stops 
together with a seal log. The time threshold can be set up in the system to take 
into account the duration of scheduled container stops. If a time frame for a 
stop is exceeded, the system triggers an alert. This means false alerts could be 
generated if for example the truck with the container is delayed due to a 
congestion of containers waiting to be loaded. That is why it is necessary to 
check the data from the seal log: if the seal was opened during the suspiciously 
long stop then the probability of smuggling or tampering is very high and the 
container should be sent for a scanning. 
All the scenarios described above can be combined into one if the corresponding 
technologies are implemented within an infrastructure in use. 
Seal Log. Data from the electronic seal log is important for container risk evaluation. 
This data can contain information about the seal standard, unauthorized seal opening or 
change of the seal for a lower standard during the container transportation.  
In case of using smart Container Security Devices (CSD) such as sensors which can 
measure temperature, humidity or cargo weight, this category can display information 
about anomalies detected by these devices. 
Scan Results. The Scan Result data set contains scan images, the indicator if the cargo 
is radioactive, and lists of radioactive substances. In general this data should be analyzed 
manually. The only case when this data can be analyzed by the system is if the container 
needs to be sent for radioactivity scanning. A system alert can be raised if radiation 
levels above certain threshold are detected. The threshold can be set in the system in 
advance. 
3.2.4 Examples of System Alerts 
 
The research on customs risk management conducted by the CASSANDRA project ( 
(41), (44)) provided 14 illustrative examples on what might be considered as “high risk 
indicators” by customs administrations, based on information obtained from the supply 
chain participants. These examples are presented in the table below. 
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Supply chain 
actor / stage 
Illustration on what might be considered as “high risk 
indicators”  
Shipper Shipper has not exported the specific commodity before  
Shipper information cannot be found from commercial registers or 
from the Internet  
Commodity Hazardous materials which may be used for terrorist acts: e.g. Sulphur 
Dioxide and Iridium 192  
Common materials which may be used for concealment purposes: e.g. 
sugar and auto parts  
Country of origin High level of corruption in the country  
Non-existing (or low) level of export controls: e.g. pre-cursor 
chemicals, narcotics, and dual use goods.  
Carrier Specific crew associated with organized crime  
Carrier history of frequent violations of customs enforced regulations  
Container Goods description does not match with the container type or with the 
total weight of the container.  
Discrepancies in seal numbers (documents versus actual seal)  
Routing and 
transshipments 
Routing of shipment is not cost effective  
Transshipment cost paid with cash  
Importer The frequency of imports does not support a “sustainable business”.  
A suspect employee is working for the importer.  
Table 2 High Risk Indicators 
3.2.5 Manual Analysis of Incidents and Scan Image 
 
The container which went through detailed inspection while entering the harbor is 
subject to manual analysis of the security risk by a customs officer. The idea of the 
whole process is that the IT system can only help to evaluate the security risk of the 
container but only a particular person, a customs officer, can make the final decision if 
the container can be released or not.  Every case corresponding to a certain container 
has a history log in the system, so that it is possible to track all the actions of the person 
responsible for the case. The way how cases are assigned to employees of the customs 
office does not influence the process of the risk evaluation. In the prototype developed 
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within the ECSIT project cases are assigned automatically to the first employee who is 
available at the time when the information from a detailed inspection of the container is 
available. It is implemented in this way as I assume that customs officers should not 
have right to choose the case in order to avoid possible subjectivity in the decision and 
congestion of “unattractive” cases. 
When information from a detailed inspection is available, the customs officer analyses 
the scan image or results from manual check together with all security alerts. This can 
include checking suspicious supply chain partners, seal logs, container parameters, cargo 
descriptions etc. This part of the process can be repeated if the container is sent for 
scanning inside the harbor or if after all inspections it is sent for an additional manual 
check. After the manual analysis of all data the decision on whether container should be 
released or rejected must be made. 
 
Figure 14 Manual Analysis of Incidents and Scan Image 
 
 
3.3 Integration of the Container Risk 
Evaluation Process with the Secure 
Supply Chain Process Supported by the 
ECSIT Infrastructure 
 
Earlier in this chapter I discuss the type of information that might be required by the 
customs authorities for risk evaluation process. I also describe sources of this 
information from legislative point of view i. e. which type of data is obliged to be 
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provided to the customs authorities by which regulation/law. Finally I outline at a high 
level the sources of this information (e.g. port authorities, terminal operators, sensor 
devices, etc.). In this section I briefly discuss the integration of the Container Risk 
Evaluation process with the ECSIT infrastructure and sources from where the 
information comes into the Container Risk Evaluation Tool. 
Integration with LCH Repository. The Container Risk Evaluation Tool is integrated 
with SAP Object Event Repository, described in Chapter 2 “Background Information 
and Related Work”. In the ECSIT infrastructure SAP Object Event Repository, or 
EPCIS Repository, is one of the components of the Logistic Collaboration Hub, a 
platform for collaboration of the supply chain actors.  Information from RFID tags and 
bar code readers is fed from partner systems to the EPCIS Repository of the Logistic 
Collaboration Hub, from where it is retrieved by the Container Risk Evaluation Tool. 
EPCIS is a query interface and a protocol developed by EPCglobal so that supply chain 
partners have a common method of integrating object unique information (22). The 
EPCIS standards based data repository, implemented as SAP Object Event Repository, 
allows product serialization (tracking a product as it moves through the supply chain), 
data capture and storage in a standardized format (in the form of EPCIS events).  
Integration with GPS navigation and Smart Lock systems. Although the GPS 
coordinates of events which are recorded by RFID and bar code readers are fed into the 
Logistic Collaboration Hub, the integration with the project partner’s GPS navigation 
and smart lock systems is planned for near future as the GPS coordinates of locations 
where events are recorded do not provide a constant tracking of the containers.  
Information from the RFID/bar code readers, GPS systems and smart locks constitutes 
additional logistical information or Cargo Route category as described in this chapter 
earlier.  
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Figure 15 Integration of the Container risk Evaluation Tool with the ECSIT Infrastructure 
 
Integration with Collaboration Engine. Another component of the Logistic 
Collaboration Hub is a Collaboration Engine which is responsible for the secure supply 
chain. It supports the collaboration of supply chain actors and information exchange 
between them. Data about the shipper, seller, importer, etc. can be provided through 
this Collaboration Engine. This data forms the Cargo Details category of information 
needed for the risk evaluation process. The integration with data from the Collaboration 
Engine is not implemented yet.  
One of the options for customs authorities to collect data on the supply chain partners 
(such as name, address, AEO/C-TPAT certification and so on) is to get it directly from 
the partner’s systems.    
Integration with Scanning Component. The Container Risk Evaluation Tool should 
be integrated also with the scanning component of the ECSIT infrastructure. Currently 
only the integration between the Logistic Collaboration Hub and scanning component 
is implemented.  To be precise, Collaboration Engine gets the link to the scan image of 
the container which is physically stored in the local database of the scanning 
component. For the real deployment of the system the direct channel between the 
Container Risk Evaluation Tool and the scanning component should be established. 
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Integration with AEO/C-TPAT databases. For real implementation of the concept, 
the mechanism for AEO status/C-TPAT certification verification of the supply chain 
partners must be provided. At the present moment although the information if a 
partner is certified or not can be theoretically provided by the Collaboration Engine, the 
procedure of verification and confirmation of this information does not exist yet.   
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Chapter 4 
Description of  the Container Risk 
Evaluation Tool  
 
In the following chapter I present the design of the Container Risk Evaluation Tool 
developed within my Master’s Thesis Project. As a first step the technologies, which are 
used for the implementation are described. After that I outline the overall design of the 
application. Finally I discuss the integration of the application with the ECSIT project 
infrastructure.   
 
4.1 Technical Description  
 
After conducting research on existing technical solutions for supply chain management, 
transportation management and global trade the following technologies have been 
chosen for the Container Risk Evaluation Tool: 
 SAP NetWeaver 7.0  
 SAP Auto-ID Enterprise, comprising of two products: SAP Object Event 
Repository (SAP OER) and SAP Auto-ID Infrastructure (SAP AII) 
 SAP Event Management (SAP EM) 
 SAP Visual Business Component 
 SAP Web Dypro ABAP  
Later I describe each technology in more detail and outline the reasons for its selection 
for use in the implementation of the prototype. 
SAP NetWeaver 7.0 (45) has been chosen as a development platform for the Container 
Risk Evaluation Tool prototype. The main reasons for this decision are: 
 a significant part of the functionality needed is already implemented in the SAP 
Global Trade Services (SAP GTS) system, as described in Chapter 2 
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“Background Information” (for example, the algorithm of check for compliance 
with the Importer Security Filing, also known as the “10+2” initiative, or 
compliance with REACH Regulation, etc.); 
 there is a possibility that customs authorities already use SAP Enterprise Core 
Component (SAP ECC), SAP Global Trade Services (SAP GTS) and SAP 
Customer Relationship Management (SAP CRM) in their everyday work – the 
integration of the Tool with these systems is technically very easy to implement; 
 the majority of big importers run SAP solutions such as SAP GTS, SAP CRM 
and SAP Transportation Management (SAP TM), which makes it easy to 
integrate the Container Risk Evaluation Tool with the systems of both supply 
chain actors and customs authorities. 
SAP NetWeaver is the current service-oriented integration platform which provides the 
development and runtime environment for SAP applications and can be used for 
integration with other applications and systems. For user interface development I use 
Web Dynpro for ABAP (WD ABAP) technology, which is the SAP standard UI 
technology for developing Web applications in the ABAP environment. It consists of a 
runtime environment and a graphical development environment with special Web 
Dynpro tools that are integrated in the ABAP Workbench (development tool of SAP 
NetWeaver platform).  
As already made clear above the programing language used for the prototype 
development is ABAP – Advanced Business Application Programming, a high-level 
programming language created by SAP. 
In the Container Risk Evaluation Tool a geographical map is used for displaying the 
route of the cargo. This technology is provided by SAP Visual Business, a user interface 
technology that visualizes data from SAP and external data sources on a single screen. 
In the prototype SAP Visual Business Component is embedded into a Web Dynpro 
application (the Container Risk Evaluation Tool itself) so that application can define a 
data exchange between the Visual Business application and the Web Dynpro 
application. Thus, data available within the Web Dynpro is used to illustrate business 
elements such as the locations of the container and the links between them that 
represent the container route. In the prototype the Visual Business component is 
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integrated by means of Web Dynpro technology. For use of SAP Visual Business 
component the Microsoft .NET Framework 3.5 Service Pack 1 is used. 
The prototype is integrated with SAP Auto-ID Enterprise by being a Web Dynpro 
application in SAP Object Event Repository. SAP Auto-ID Enterprise (38) is a solution 
for the serialization of information and comprises of two products: the SAP Auto-ID 
Infrastructure (SAP AII) and SAP Object Event repository. SAP Object Event 
Repository is the repository which allows the capturing, storage and querying data about 
uniquely identified objects. The system is described in greater detail in Chapter 2 
“Background Information and Related Work”. 
The automatic monitoring of events, setting up of alerts and exception management 
scenarios is handled in SAP Object Event Repository through the use of SAP Event 
Management (39). 
 
4.2 Design of the Prototype 
 
The Container Risk Evaluation Tool is a Web Dynpro application with the name 
ZCUS_RISK_EVALUATION_V2, integrated into the SAP OER system. It has six 
main views: FIRST_VIEW, CARGO_DETAILS, CARGO_ROUTE, 
SCAN_RESULT, SEAL_LOG and DOCUMENTS. In addition to these six views it 
also has several auxiliary views which are not described here. View of Web Dynpro 
application contains the visible part of Web Dynpro components. Consequently, it 
consists primarily of UI elements.  Additionally, the View controller allows for 
responding to user actions. 
In any Web Dynpro application views are grouped into a window to be displayed into a 
relevant context and enable navigation between individual views. In the Container Risk 
Evaluation Tool the window which groups all main views is called MAIN and is 
initialized when the application starts:  
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Figure 16 the main window of the application and its content 
 
For navigation purposes each view has inbound and outbound plugs, which represent 
entry and exit points for the view. All actions, which are needed to be implemented 
when a plug fires, are set in a corresponding for that plug method. From the figure 
above it is seen that the FIRST_VIEW, the initial view that is seen by the user when the 
application starts, has several inbound and outbound plugs.  From the user point of 
view they fire when the user wants to go to a risk category and back, as it is seen from 
the figure below: 
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Figure 17 Views of the application 
 
As an example, the figure below explains what is happening when a user navigates from 
the initial view (cases overview) to the view with cargo details. When a user presses the 
button “Cargo Details” on the initial view, the corresponding outbound plug of the 
FIRST_VIEW fires: 
 
Figure 18 Outbound plug "to_cargo_details" of the initial view 
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Figure 19 Navigation to the cargo details view 
 
In the method which is responsible for firing the corresponding inbound plug of the 
CARGO_DETAILS view all actions that should be implemented while opening the 
view are set. For example, the cargo details data (mainly ISF data) is displayed on the 
screen: 
 
Figure 20 A piece of code from the HANDLEFROM_FIRST_VIEW method 
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The whole logic of the application is implemented in the manner as described above. 
The only difference from a design point of view is the implementation of the methods 
responsible for retrieving data from SAP Object Event Repository, such as ID of the 
containers, loading of the container, storage, arriving of the container to the storage 
area, etc. These methods are implemented in a separate assistant class of the application. 
For using a map in the Web Dynpro application, SAP Visual Business Component is 
embedded into it. In the application the standard Geo-Map window 
(MAIN_WINDOW of the SAP Visual Business Component) is embedded into 
CARGO_ROUTE view with the help of UI Element MAP: 
 
Figure 21 Embedded into the CARGO_ROUTE view for the map 
 
Navigation and data flow between SAP Visual Business Component and the Web 
Dynpro application is implemented with the help of Inbound and Outbound plugs in 
the same way as it is described above for all views of the application. 
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4.3 Integration of the Container Risk 
Evaluation Tool with the ECSIT 
Infrastructure 
 
Earlier in Chapter 3 “The Concept” I describe the concept of how the Container Risk 
Evaluation Process can be integrated into the secure supply chain supported by the 
ECSIT infrastructure and the sources of security relevant information that can be 
collected for the Container Risk Evaluation Tool.  In the following section I describe in 
detail how the integration of the Container Risk Evaluation Tool with the ECSIT 
infrastructure is implemented. 
Integration with LCH Repository. As described in the previous chapter, a main 
component of the ECSIT Infrastructure is the Logistic Collaboration Hub, a platform 
for collaboration between supply chain actors. The Container Risk Evaluation Tool is 
integrated with the EPCIS standards based data repository of this Hub, which is 
represented by the SAP Object Event Repository, described in Chapter 2 “Background 
Information and Related Work”. EPCIS is a query interface and a protocol developed 
by EPCglobal, so that supply chain partners have a common method of integrating 
object unique information (22).  
 In the Container Risk Evaluation Tool the information, obtained from SAP OER is 
used for logistic related information, such as tracking of the container along with the 
supply chain and route assessment (e.g. comparison of the actual cargo route with the 
planned route).  
The Container Risk Evaluation Tool is a Web Dynpro application in the SAP OER 
system. The integration is implemented in the way that an auxiliary background program 
in the SAP OER system retrieves data in a standard XML form from the event 
repository and pushes it to the local database tables which are used by the Tool. From 
these database tables the application retrieves relevant data by means of a standard way 
in ABAP - Open SQL language which provides uniform syntax and semantics for all of 
the database systems supported by the SAP. 
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Figure 22 Integration of the Tool with SAP OER 
 
Integration with Collaboration Engine. The integration of the Tool with the 
Collaboration Engine, described in Chapter 3 “The Concept” is not currently 
implemented due to the fact that the process of data flow has not been established yet. 
Integration can be performed with the help of XML format for data exchange between 
two systems. Another option can be to use IDoc (stands for intermediate document) – a 
standard data structure for electronic data interchange (EDI) between SAP systems or 
between SAP application and external programs. The IDoc data format is similar to 
XML in purpose but differs in syntax.  
Integration with AEO/C-TPAT databases. Integration with the Collaboration 
Engine can theoretically provide the Container Risk Evaluation Tool with information 
if a supply chain actor is certified or not. But the verification mechanism has not been 
established yet, as the way how to get access to the database of AEO/C-TPAT certified 
companies and automatically verify data is not clear at the present moment. On the 
official web site of European Commission (7) it is possible to validate an Authorized 
Economic Operators by entering the full holder name.  But it is not clear yet how this 
database can be integrated into the ECSIT infrastructure. Accesses to the database of C-
TPAT certified companies is granted only to C-TPAT holders and can be accessed on 
the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism Security Link Portal (46). 
Integration with Scanning Component. The integration with the scanning 
component of the ECSIT infrastructure is also not implemented as it is not known at 
the present moment under which circumstances the customs authorities will request 
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scan images i.e. if they need to get scan image of every scanned container or only under 
special request. 
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Chapter 5 
Evaluation 
 
5.1 Possible scenarios  
 
Three scenarios have been selected to test and evaluate the process for container risk 
evaluation as well as the tool developed within this work.  
Each scenario refers to a possible business case of cargo transportation from Germany 
to the USA. The aim is of course not to cover all the possible activities in the transport 
process and risk evaluation, but rather to map different relevant situations where the 
Container Risk Evaluation Process can be put into practice. 
5.1.1 Scenario A: Deviation from the planed route and 
unauthorized seal opening  
 
The objective of this use-case is to demonstrate the Container Risk Evaluation process 
in the situation where the container has changed its planned route and a seal was 
opened without authorization during the transportation. The case can be illustrative for 
scenarios involving terrorism and smuggling of prohibited goods. Terrorist 
organizations may be involved in cross-border cargo flows for many reasons: they can 
embed into the cargo destructive objects and materials, for example an explosive device, 
or they can use international supply chain to deliver materials, equipment and people 
across borders in order to prepare and carry out their malicious operations. 
 
A-1 Business scenario. The scenario involves an international supply chain of cargo 
from the German city of Stuttgart to an American marine port in Charleston via the 
port of Bremerhaven in Germany. A risk of the sea container is evaluated by customs 
authorities with help of the Container Risk Evaluation Tool when the container is at the 
last foreign port before it is loaded onto a vessel destined for the United States.  
 
 63 
 
A-2 Automatic capturing of data. According to the process flow, described in 
Chapter 3 “The Concept”, automatic data capturing begin during the transportation of 
the container. When the first element of data is fed into the system, a case is created 
automatically by the system. The term “Case” is borrowed from the terminology of SAP 
Investigative Case Management system, described in Chapter 2 “Background 
Information and Related Work”. In the Container Risk Evaluation Tool a “Case” 
corresponds to a container whose risk is evaluated. The data capturing continues until 
the moment when the container has arrived at the last foreign port before loading onto 
a vessel to the USA. During data capture the system checks obtained data for 
compliance and against criteria detailing prohibited cargo, terrorist organizations, and 
economic and political embargoes.  
In the figure below one can see a case created in the Container Risk Evaluation system 
with the ID number urn:epc:id:grai:1234567.00006.236489227188 and the 
status “Waiting for information”, as well as four risk categories corresponding to that 
case. These categories present information about the cargo in a structured way: in every 
category the information is gathered according to the risk aspect which is evaluated 
separately in the system, but the overall picture of the situation can be derived only after 
thorough analysis of all categories together. These categories are: Cargo Details, Cargo 
Route, Scan Result and Seal Log. The categories are described more detail in Chapter 3 
“The Concept”. The fifth category “Documents” contains additionally requested 
shipping documents that can be useful for risk assessment, such as Bill of Lading or 
Sales Order.  
While capturing data the system does not evaluate the risk of the categories, so it is seen 
in the figure below that all categories are blue colored meaning that the risk is not 
evaluated yet. It is also seen that the case has appeared on the “Waiting for 
information” tab of the cases table and the overall risk of the container is not evaluated 
(it is colored in a yellow color). While the case is on the “Waiting for information” tab 
the customs officer does not need to do anything with it. It is assumed that the customs 
officer does not check this case until it appears on the “Action needed” tab of the table. 
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Figure 23 Initial view of the application 
 
 
A-2.1 Evaluation of the concept. The weakest part of the concept is the extent to 
which data from sources of information as described in the previous chapter is 
sufficient for risk evaluation of the container. Customs authorities are not willing to 
provide any information about the process of risk evaluation they currently use. The 
main reason for this is the potential security threat that revealing this information can 
cause. We can only assume that the information described in Chapter 3 “The Concept” 
is sufficient enough to make the decision on the necessity of scanning the container as 
well as on releasing the container into the country, with only one correction that it is 
impossible to be 100% sure about the content of the container in question. Because of 
this issue I suggest in my concept to scan as a sample a certain percentage of the 
containers which originally were supposed to be released without any detailed 
inspection (Green Lane containers, described in section 5.1.3 of this chapter).  
 
A-2.2 Evaluation of the prototype. The automatic capturing of data from the Cargo 
Details risk category is not currently implemented in the prototype. A certain part of 
that data can be fed into the system after integration with the Logistic Collaboration 
Hub, a platform for cooperation between all supply chain actors, developed within the 
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ECSIT project. The integration is planned for the near future and described in greater 
details in Chapter 4 “Description of the Container Risk Evaluation Tool” and Chapter 6 
“Summary and Future Work”. 
The current implementation of the prototype also does not support automatic 
integration with the infrastructure of electronic seals and sensors on the container. This 
integration is planned and described in the next chapter.  
Data about the route of the container is obtained through SAP Object Event 
Repository. This part of the functionality is fully implemented in the prototype and 
described in Chapter 4 “Description of the Container Risk Evaluation Tool”. 
 
A-3 Automatic analysis of the incidents. As mentioned in Chapter 3 “The Concept”, 
in order to avoid undesirable congestion of containers in front of the entrance to the 
harbor the decision about container scanning should be ready to be made by the time 
the container arrives at the harbor. In the figure below it is seen that after initial 
automatic evaluation of the potential risk several categories are colored in red, which 
means that, based on the provided information, some incidents during the container 
transportation were detected and the risk of the container is estimated as high. In the 
described situation the container is automatically sent for x-ray scanning and 
radioactivity analysis while entering the harbor.  
The incidents detected by the system in the given scenario are: 
 Absence of AEO status/C-TPAT certification or any compliant status, and  
invalid address of Buyer and Ship-To party – data related to the Cargo Details 
category; 
 Deviation from the planned route – data related to the Cargo Route category; 
 Unauthorized opening of the container – data related to the Seal Log category. 
 
A-3.1 Evaluation of the concept. It is not clear yet if the absence of the AEO status 
or C-TPAT certification of one of the participants of the supply chain should be 
considered as an incident and has to lead to the obligatory scanning of the container. It 
is also not clear how the system should react in the case of the misspelling of the name 
or address of one of the participants of the supply chain. In the worst case scenario if 
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the misspelling is the only incident detected by the system the container will still be sent 
for obligatory scanning while entering the port and that can lead to unnecessary 
overload in the work of the marine ports.  
 
A-3.2 Evaluation of the prototype. The automatic analysis of incidents is not fully 
implemented yet, partly due to the fact that not all data is fed into the system 
automatically.  
Significantly, it has not been finally decided how the cargo route should be evaluated. At 
the current moment it is assumed in the system that a planned route should be 
automatically obtained by the system before the transportation of the container. It is 
assumed that the system should compare the planned route with the events obtained 
from the SAP Object Event Repository. Although events are automatically fed into the 
system (this part is implemented in the prototype), the algorithm for matching this data 
is currently not implemented because of the absence of information about the format in 
which the real cargo route can be obtained. 
 
A-4 Manual check of the scan image and all incidents. When the scan image and 
information about the container radioactivity have been obtained, the case appears on 
the “Action needed” tab and Scan Result category color becomes yellow. The yellow 
color of the category means that the risk of that category cannot be automatically 
evaluated and a manual check is needed. In Case Log Table it is possible to check the 
reason why the case has appeared on the “Action needed” tab - the scan image of the 
container is available. Moreover the status of the case now is “Scan is available”. The 
status and case log help the customs officer who is assigned to the case quickly 
understand what action is needed from him or her.  
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Figure 24 Initial view after automatic risk evaluation 
 
From that moment the customs officer can begin the manual risk evaluation process. In 
the prototype it is assumed that cases are assigned automatically to the first employee 
who is available at the time when the information from a detailed inspection of the 
container is available – an employee cannot choose which case is assigned to them. It is 
implemented in this way in order to avoid possible subjectivity in the decision.  
The sequence of actions for risk evaluation process depends on the customs employee. 
In general the employee should check step by step all incidents that were detected by 
the system and compare scan image or manual check results with cargo description 
from the cargo manifest.  If the employee requests additional information (for example 
the container should be sent for additional manual check or for scanning for nuclear 
materials), the case appears again on the tab “Waiting for information” with the 
corresponding status and relevant risk category highlighted in a yellow color. 
In the given scenario the employee has decided to check the Cargo Details category 
first. In the figure below one can see the Cargo Details view of the application and all 
detected incidents corresponding to that risk category. 
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Figure 25 Cargo Details view 
 
It is easily noticeable that the system has detected that neither the Buyer nor Ship-To 
party has C-TPAT certification, AEO or equivalent compliance status. The absence of 
C-TPAT certification/AEO status does not show yet that the container poses a high 
risk but it must be analyzed together with other incidents. The system has also detected 
that the addresses of Buyer and Ship-To party are not valid. After checking for 
misspelling the employee is convinced that both the Buyer and Ship-To party either do 
not exist in reality or have some problems with documents. After analysis of cargo 
details the employee marks that category as category with high risk which is seen in the 
figure below. The mark helps the customs officer to understand that this category has 
been already manually checked and there is no need to come back to it. 
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Figure 26 Cargo Details view - already checked 
 
After Cargo Details the employee decides to check cargo route. It is seen from figure 31 
that according to the scenario a deviation from the planned route of the container has 
been detected. Moreover in Munich it is detected that the seal was opened and replaced 
with a seal of a lower standard. The seal log is possible to check also in the Seal Log 
Category (figure 32). 
 
Figure 27 Cargo Route view 
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Figure 28 Seal Log view 
 
It is important to manually check the scan image obtained and the results from the 
radioactivity analysis. This information is presented in the Scan Result category.  As it is 
seen from the figure below, although the container is supposed to contain only tires, 
glasses and a bike, according to the Cargo Description, scanning has shown that cargo is 
radioactive.  
 
Figure 29 Scan Result view 
 
All incidents detected by the system indicate the high risk of the container. The 
employee can send the container for additional scanning for nuclear identification and 
wait for results or immediately mark the Scan Result category as checked and reject the 
container. 
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Figure 30 The Scan Result category is checked 
 
If the container is rejected the corresponding case appears in the “Resolved Cases” tab 
with the status “Rejected”, as seen in the figure below. 
Figure 31 Container is rejected 
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A-4.1 Evaluation of the concept. In the described scenario certain information about 
the cargo (such as the address of the buyer, the absence of AEO/C-TPAT statuses, etc.) 
indicated that the container should be scanned. These indicators can be different. The 
research on customs risk management conducted by the CASSANDRA project ( (41), 
(44)) provided 14 illustrative examples on what might be considered as “high risk 
indicators” by customs administrations, based on information obtained from the supply 
chain participants. These examples are presented in Chapter 3 “The Concept”. 
As it is seen from the scenario, a lot of information can be derived from the data 
provided by the system. In the given scenario the discrepancy between the scan result 
with Cargo Description together with information about deviation from the planned 
route and unauthorized seal opening during the transportation is critical as it shows the 
possibility of smuggling of radioactive dangerous substances that can be used for a 
radiological weapon. This example shows very clearly how additional logistical data can 
help with the evaluation process.  
 
A-4.2 Evaluation of the prototype. The example described in this section has shown 
how easily the prototype allows the matching of various kinds of information provided 
to the customs authorities by different sources. For example it is easier to evaluate the 
content of the container, comparing cargo description from the cargo manifest with the 
scan image if this information is grouped together and displayed on the same view, as it 
is implemented in the Scan Result view. The same applies to matching seal log data with 
the cargo route, which is presented in the same view (the Cargo Route category).   
In the above described scenario the case has different statuses during its lifetime. A 
status changes after certain actions are conducted automatically by the system or 
manually by the customs employee. The status flow is depicted in the figure below. The 
color of each status in the figure corresponds to the color of one of the risk categories 
which influenced on status change. The color coding of case statuses help custom 
officers to understand at a glance the current state of the case. 
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Figure 32 Status Flow 
 
5.1.2 Scenario B: Not Trusted Party  
 
The objective of this scenario is to demonstrate that not all incidents automatically 
detected by the system lead to the cargo being rejected.  As the concept developed 
within the project introduces the Green Lane scenario (illustrated in section 5.3 
“Scenario C: Green lane”) which allows the release of the cargo without any detailed 
inspection, we need to be sure as much as possible that the cargo does not pose any 
risk. It is assumed in the concept that it is better to scan more containers than miss one 
with a high risk. 
 
B-1 Business scenario. As in the previous scenario the container is transported from 
Stuttgart to the American marine port in Charleston. Both containers from each 
scenario are supposed to be loaded onto the same vessel.  
The case described in this scenario has an ID number 
urn:epc:id:grai:1234567.00006.907820277033. Actions which are similar to 
those discussed in the previous section are not repeated in this section.   
 
 74 
 
B-2 Automatic capturing of data. Automatic data capturing takes place in the same 
manner as for the previous case, described in 5.1.1/A-2 section. For this container the 
customs authorities need the same data elements as they required for the previous case, 
because according to the scenario both containers are transported from Germany to the 
USA on the same vessel and on the same date. 
 
B-3 Automatic analysis of the incidents. Automatic analysis of the incidents for this 
case is also very similar to the analysis of the case described above. As in the previous 
case the container is sent for scanning because an incident is detected by the system.  
 
 
Figure 33 Initial View 
 
B-4 Manual check of the scan image and all incidents. As in the previous example 
the customs employee decides to check the incidents in the Cargo Details category. It is 
seen from the figure below that according to the scenario the only incident that has 
been detected by the system is the fact that the Seller is not a trusted party, i.e. the Seller 
is not C-TPAT certified/ does not have AEO status.  
 
 75 
 
 
Figure 34 Cargo Details View 
 
After the Cargo Details category the employee checks the scan image of the container 
together with the cargo description. As it is seen from the figure below, the cargo 
description matches with the scan image and no radiation has been detected during the 
scanning. Keeping in mind that all other categories do not show any alerts the employee 
decides to release the container although one of the participants of the supply chain is 
not a trusted party.  
 
B-4.1 Evaluation of the concept. This example has shown that not all alerts lead to 
the rejection of the cargo when attempting to enter the USA. As it is mentioned 
previously, it is assumed in the concept that it is better to scan more containers than 
miss one with a high risk. 
 Another possible alert could be for example container seal opening during the 
transportation as a result of an unscheduled but authorized check. The Seal Log in this 
case still records the opening of the container; the system automatically detects it as an 
incident and will send the container for scanning.  
 
B-4.2 Evaluation of the prototype. As in the previous example, the prototype has 
shown that evaluating the container risk is easier when all relevant information is 
collected and displayed together in corresponding categories. For example, for the Scan 
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Result category one can match the cargo description provided by the Cargo Manifest 
with scan image and ensure that everything that is listed in the description is displayed 
by the image and identify anything that is not listed. 
 
 
Figure 35 Scan Image of the container is checked 
 
 
Figure 36 Container is Released 
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5.1.3 Scenario C: Green Lane  
 
The next case illustrates a possible Green Lane scenario where the container is released 
without any detailed inspection at the port before loading onto the vessel bound for the 
USA.  
 
C-1 Business scenario. As in the previous scenario the container is transported from 
Stuttgart to the American marine port in Charleston. The case corresponding to the 
container has the ID number urn:epc:id:grai:1234567.00006.907820277032. It 
is seen from the figure below that like in all previous scenarios case is created 
automatically when the first data element is captured by the system. 
 
Figure 37 Case is created in the system 
 
C-2 Automatic capturing of data. Automatic data capturing is the same as for all 
cases described above because according to the scenario all containers are transported 
from Germany to the USA on the same vessel and on the same date. 
 
C-3 Automatic analysis of the incidents. The algorithm for the automatic analysis of 
incidents is the same as one described for the previous cases. The only difference is in 
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the outcome of the analysis: in this example no incidents are detected by the system and 
the container can enter the port without any additional inspection.  
 
C-4 Manual check of the scan image and all incidents. As the objective of the 
Green Lane scenario is the automatic release of the cargo without a manual check and 
further detailed inspection the customs officer does not work with this case in the 
system: when the case is created it appears on the “Waiting for information” tab, it is 
assumed that when the container arrives at the port the system analysis the risk 
automatically, and since according to the scenario no incidents are detected (all 
participants of the supply chain are AEO authorized/ C-TPAT certified companies, the 
seal was not opened during the transportation of the container, the route deviation was 
not detected, etc.), the container is released and appears on the “Resolved Cases” tab 
with status “released”, as it is seen from the figure below: 
 
Figure 38 Container is released - green lane scenario 
 
B-4.1 Evaluation of the concept. As it is mentioned before, even if all requested 
information is provided to the customs authorities they cannot be fully certain about the 
content of the container. That is why it is worth to scan as a sample a certain percentage 
of the containers which originally were supposed to be released without any detailed 
inspection. 
 79 
 
 
B-4.2 Evaluation of the prototype. Currently, the functionality of automatically 
setting a certain percentage of green lane containers for additional detailed inspection as 
a parameter in the system in order to ensure the security and the integrity of the process 
is not implemented in the prototype. Random additional checks can be established in 
the system e.g. every 10th green lane container is sent for x-ray scanning and 
radioactivity analysis. 
5.2 Discussion  
 
The Container Risk Evaluation Tool is a prototype of the application for risk evaluation 
of the containers bound for the USA and EU. It is apparent that the prototype does not 
have a certain part of the functionality implemented yet as it is not the final application, 
but it allows evaluation of the concept and serves as a good base for further discussions.  
The scenarios described above together with the concept were demonstrated during the 
knowledge sharing section to the partner project CASSANDRA. According to the 
feedback from the CASSANDRA project, the concept developed within the Master’s 
Thesis project might be a good alternative to the “100% scanning law”. The Container 
Evaluation Tool needs further development, especially performance tuning, and further 
integration with the ECSIT infrastructure. This additional work is described in greater 
detail in the next chapter. 
A harsher criticism might be that the application is implemented in the SAP system and 
thereby, very dependent on the SAP environment. But as it is described above in 
Chapter 4 “Description of the Container Risk Evaluation Tool”, the reason for the 
choice of SAP environment is the fact that it allows easy integration with SAP Object 
Event Repository, systems of the majority of European and American supply chain 
actors, and systems in use by customs authorities.   
The concept suggested in the Master’s Thesis also needs further clarification, especially 
in regards to the Green Lane scenario. Special laws or regulations need to be defined 
under which containers can legitimately avoid detailed inspection at the port before 
entering the country. Although at present this topic is of interest, a legislation base has 
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not yet been developed to enable the Green Lane scenario. All other weak parts of the 
concept are described in the previous section of this chapter. 
Another problem that arises and which is not covered by the concept developed within 
the Master’s Thesis project is the problem of possible industry espionage if supply chain 
partners reveal additional security related information. To solve the problem it should 
be decided exactly which information can be revealed to the customs authorities. One 
option can be to analyze all data in a neutral platform, for example in the Logistic 
Collaboration Hub described in Chapter 3 “The Concept”, and then send the analysis 
outcome to the Container Risk Evaluation Tool which is hosted by the customs 
authorities. For example, the alert that the seal was opened does not contain any risk of 
industry espionage but only security relevant information which can be used to evaluate 
the risk of the container. In this case the neutral platform should be certified and 
recognized by the customs authorities.  
The problem of industry espionage is not a focus of this thesis, but it is definitely 
warrants future research as without clear definition of how to protect security related 
information the concept of the container risk evaluation loses its practical sense.  
The concept is not in its final form yet - it should go through a long period of evolution 
before being implemented in real life.  
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Chapter 6 
Summary and Future Work 
 
In this Master’s Thesis report I have presented a concept for container security 
evaluation. The concept can be an alternative to the “100% scanning law” as it reduces 
the need for a container scan but enhances security through additional evaluation of 
logistical data of the container.  
I have introduced a semi-automatic evaluation approach and a first prototype 
supporting the evaluation of security relevant container and supply chain data. 
The prototype for the Container Risk Evaluation Tool, developed within the project  
 reduces the need for container scanning and introduces a possible green lane 
scenario 
 enhances security through additional security related information 
 supports customs/border personnel during evaluation of container security risks  
During the next stage of the project I plan to enhance and optimize the first version of 
the prototype.   
The current implementation of the application does not have integration with the 
Logistic Collaboration Hub which is planned to be implemented in near future. The 
integration is needed as almost all data from Cargo Details category should be fed into 
the system from the Logistic Collaboration Hub, a platform for cooperation of all 
supply chain actors.  
Another step in the development of the prototype is its integration with seal and sensor 
data from the ContainIT project, a partner research project in the scope of the secure 
supply chain management system. In the ContainIT project, goods are monitored with 
sensors along the supply chain in order to check any regulation violation during 
transportation, storage or manipulation. The ContainIT infrastructure of container 
security devices and sensors are planned to be used in the ECSIT project. Consequently, 
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data from the CSDs and sensors will be integrated into the Container Risk Evaluation 
Tool.  
Performance tuning and further UI development is also a part of the future work. The 
prototype needs optimization for a larger number of cases in the system; the number of 
calls to the database should be limited and all required information should be held in 
memory in the form of internal tables - an ABAP structure that provides means of 
taking data from a fixed structure (tables of database) and storing it in working memory 
in ABAP. 
As a result of the work accomplished during the Master’s Thesis project, the current 
work forms a solid foundation for further development in the scope of secure supply 
chain  management and supports a truly efficient risk evaluation process. 
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Appendix A 
 
List of  Acronyms 
 
ABI Automated Broker Interface  
ACL Agent Communication Language 
AI Artificial Intelligence 
AIS Automatic Identification System 
CSD Container Security Device 
EPC Electronic Product Code  
EPCIS EPC Information Services  
ERP Enterprise Resource Planning system 
EU  European Union 
FIPA The Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents 
FP7  European Union Framework Program 7 
CBP Customs and Border Protection 
EDI Electronic Data Interchange 
GDSN Global Data Synchronization Network 
GPS Global Positioning System 
ICT Information and Communication Technologies 
MIS Management Information System 
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ONS Object Name Service 
RFID Radio Frequency Identification  
SCAC  Standard Carrier Alpha Code 
SICIS Shared Intermodal Container Information System 
SOA Service Oriented Architecture  
TREC Tamper Resistant Embedded Controller 
WCO  World Customs Organization 
WTO  World Trade Organization 
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Appendix B 
 
Definition of  Terms  
 
Term  Definition 
ABI Automated Broker Interface - a component of the U.S. 
Customs Service's Automated Commercial System that permits 
qualified participants to electronically file required import data 
with Customs. Currently, over 96% of all entries filed with 
Customs are filed through ABI (13).    
 SCAC or Standard Carrier Alpha Code, a two-to-four letter 
identification, is used by the United States to identify freight 
carriers in computer systems and shipping documents such as 
Bill of Lading, Freight Bill and etc. 
EPC or Electronic Product Code, is a universal identifier for unique 
identification of physical objects. EPC is created and described 
by EPCglobal Tag Data Standard which can be freely 
downloaded in (20).   
EPCglobal is an organization created by cooperation between GS1 and 
GS1 US that works towards the worldwide adoption and 
standardization of Electronic Product Code (EPC) technology. 
EPCIS or Electronic Product Code Information Services, is a standard, 
developed by EPCglobal, which describes interfaces, discovery 
services, and security mechanisms for the capturing and 
querying Electronic Product Code (EPC) related data. In order 
to allow competition among IT providers the standard does not 
specify the possible implementation of the service operations or 
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databases.  
FIPA or the Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents, is an 
international organization which promotes technologies and 
interoperability specifications for physical agents. More 
information can be found in official web page of the 
organization in (21). 
GDSN or GS1 Global Data Synchronization Network, is a network 
which connects trading partners to the GS1 Global Registry® 
via a network of interoperable GDSN-certified data pools. 
GS1 is an international not-for-profit association founded in 1977 
which is dedicated to the development and implementation of 
global standards and solutions to improve the efficiency and 
visibility of supply chains. Nowadays, the system of standards, 
developed by this association, is the most widely-used. The 
official web site of the organization is http://www.gs1.org/.  
Intrastat certain information, which a company in European Union is 
obliged to declare if it trades goods with other members of 
European Union. The type of information depends on whether 
the value of Arrivals (purchases or imports) or Dispatches (sales 
or exports) exceeds the annual Intrastat exemption threshold/s. 
(47). 
ITAR or International Traffic in Arms Regulations – is a set of United 
States government regulations that controls the export and 
import of defense-related articles and services on the United 
States Munitions List (48). 
Ontology is a formal description of the concepts and relationships for 
enabling knowledge sharing and reuse. More formal definition 
can be found in (22): “Ontology is a formal specification of a 
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shared conceptualization”. 
ONS or Object Name Service, transforms the Electronic Product 
Code  (EPC) into URLs. 
REACH Registration, Evaluation, Authorization, and Restriction of 
Chemicals (REACH), is European Union Regulation of 
December 18, 2006 which came into effect on June 1, 2007 
(Regulation (EC) no 1907/2006).  The regulation is about the 
production and use of chemical substances, and their potential 
impacts on human health and environment. 
SAP Web Application 
Server (SAP Web AS) 
an application server from SAP. It serves as the underlying 
infrastructure for all SAP solutions and supports both J2EE and 
ABAP. Basically all SAP applications run on top of the SAP 
Web AS. A non-SAP application that is based on J2EE could 
also run on the SAP Web AS. 
Sanctioned Party List 
(SPL) 
a list containing persons and companies with whom trade is 
prohibited by law 
TREC or Tamper Resistant Embedded Controller, is developed by 
IBM’s Zurich Research Lab wireless container security device, 
which can track movements of the container to which it is 
attached and make this  information available to authorized 
entities; it also can collect data about physical location of the 
container, its state (temperature, humidity, door status and 
others). 
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